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The policy space in which development happens spans the globe and innumerable contexts 
depending on the geographical, cultural, or normative scope of the intervention. Taking the 
complexity of the policy space, the agents of development and the tension between objectivity 
and orthodox practice and subjective contextual practice, it comes as no surprise that 
development features a significant degree of unpredictability in outcome. While some element of 
unpredictability is taken as a given in practice, I argue that theorists and practitioners should not 
yield so readily to the unknown. The framework presented here with which practitioners may 
improve upon their analytical capacities offers an introductory roadmap for the types of pre-
intervention research necessary to anticipate and mitigate the effects of unintended externalities. 
In this paper, I apply structuration theory to analyze failures in World Bank development 
practice. I argue that the structural configurations of recipient states constrain the potential of 
externally-directed development initiatives that in turn can reinforce the very institutional 
features of ‘underdevelopment’ that are targeted for change. Developing structural and 
institutional profiles of recipient states in anticipation of development activity will reduce the 
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The developing world possesses huge amounts of untapped normative and innovative 
potential. For decades, global policy discourse has targeted the developing world for external 
interventions designed to generate sustainable growth in recipient state economies and to raise 
standards of living for people in the developing world. External interventions by the developed 
world in developing state recipients have spanned decades and have reached some of the most 
remote regions of the world in attempts to replicate the ‘developed’ state condition. Results of 
these interventions, however, are varied and even contemporary interventions are, at best, a 
pseudo-science. What qualifies as a success or failure in externally-directed development 
interventions is also, at the end of the day, a matter of opinion.  
Contemporary development and political discourse features a great degree of 
introspection regarding the development enterprise. There seem to be no guarantees. Successes 
and failures are subjective and no policy tool is a guarantee of a successful development 
intervention. With an increasing array of development policy tools at the disposal of 
development practitioners and increasing awareness of exactly how complex an undertaking 
‘development’ is, contemporary challenges revolve around honing the analytical tools 
practitioners have at their disposal. With the flood of information and cautionary tales regarding 
the unintended externalities of externally directed development interventions increasing daily, 
practitioners must be better equipped to analyze the information at their disposal to craft a 
tailored development intervention—one that performs in an anticipated manner given the 
recipient state’s context.  
Despite proliferation of normative and practical wisdom in the field, there remains a huge 
degree of uncertainty in the ability of development practitioners to guarantee or even predict 
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success for their proposed initiatives. This variability in outcome stems in part from the inherent 
complexity of ‘development’ as a concept. Development at its very core implicates questions of: 
autonomy, progress, capacity and optimization of a given state for the benefit of its people. In 
practice, solutions to these questions are either orthodox in their adoption of ‘best practice’ 
principles or innovative, holistic in application or targeted, and financed and conducted by 
external agents, internal agents, or a combination of the two. The policy space in which 
development happens spans the globe and innumerable contexts depending on the geographical, 
cultural, or normative scope of the intervention. Taking the complexity of the policy space, the 
agents of development and the tension between objectivity and orthodox practice and subjective 
contextual practice, it comes as no surprise that development features a significant degree of 
unpredictability in outcome. While some element of unpredictability is taken as a given in 
practice, I argue that theorists and practitioners should not yield so readily to the unknown. There 
may be few guarantees in development outcomes but far more needs to be done in improving the 
chances and preconditions of success.  
The framework presented here with which practitioners may improve upon their 
analytical capacities offers an introductory roadmap for the types of pre-intervention research 
necessary to anticipate and mitigate the effects of unintended externalities in development 
practice. More importantly, my contribution to the development literature as well as to political 
analysis of the developing world and the development enterprise lies in the conceptual tool 
presented here. In this paper, I apply structuration theory to analyze failures in World Bank 
development practice. Through analysis of recipient state structures and institutions, I offer a 
theoretical conceptualization of the problem in order to demonstrate the feasibility of progress 
and improvement of development practice past its current degree of stagnation. This 
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conceptualization allows practitioners to analyze recipient states as well as development 
interventions with more precision and greater awareness of recipient state contexts in a way that 
limits the risk of unforeseen externalities. The core of my contribution comes from the 
introduction of the following analytical concepts through which specific development problems 
can be categorized and addressed: (productive and non-productive) status quo agent-structure 
interaction, structural maturation, structural subversion, and types of agency (passive, 
knowledgeable, and empowered). This allows practitioners to attribute successes and failures in 
the development intervention more effectively and focusses in analysis and improvement of a 
recipient state’s absorptive capacity. Given the conceptual and practical complexities of the 
development enterprise, this paper addresses the question: In what ways do structures and 
institutions in recipient states affect the effectiveness of externally-directed development 
initiatives? 
I argue here that the structural configurations of recipient states constrain the potential of 
externally-directed development initiatives which in turn, may reinforce the very institutional 
features of ‘underdevelopment’ that are targeted for change. Structural configurations of 
recipient states signal whether an externally-directed development initiative will succeed or fail. 
Developing structural and institutional profiles of recipient states in anticipation of development 
activity will reduce the very prevalent risk of failed development initiatives.  
The data on which this research is founded were collected through qualitative analysis of 
World Bank program review documents of three development interventions in Albania, 
Indonesia, and Lesotho. Case studies were non-randomly selected to illustrate the type of 
analysis I advocate in this paper. I use the World Bank’s development activity to exemplify 
orthodox ‘externally-directed development activity’. As one of the world’s largest producers of 
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development policy, practice and knowledge, the World Bank is a fitting focal point for analysis 
for the purposes of this paper. The case studies were also selected to ensure the programs being 
analyzed tend to feature varied geographical representation. The intention behind this was to 
demonstrate the universally applicable nature of the analytical concepts I develop in this paper. 
The programs being analyzed feature social sector interventions, this does not affect the type of 
analysis being conducted since the crux of the analytical framework developed here contends 
that development initiatives and outcomes are influenced by cross-sectoral, institutional, and 
structural factors. In other words, ‘social’ sectors of a state are actually far less clearly delineated 
from other sectors (i.e. economic, administrative, cultural, etc.) when analyzing development 
systemically. Another selection criterion ensured projects that offer solely technical assistance in 
the form of external consultations regarding economic policies or expertise on technical 
innovations were excluded. The assumption is that these projects feature objective development 
products in the form of expertise, as such they are not influenced by recipient state structures or 
institutions.  
The analytical framework presented here was devised through scrutiny of the practical 
literature on development and then used to assess the case studies. Development theory was also 
informative and relevant in this review of the literature, however, given the divide between 
development theory and practice and the focus on providing a workable, implementable tool for 
improving development practice; the focus for this research was on the critical literature on 
development practice. This is well-represented by William Easterly’s writings on how to 
improve development practice and counter-balanced by Dambisa Moyo’s book Dead Aid, which 
argues that development aid has stagnated and must be phased out. As gaps in the development 
orthodoxy became apparent and a loose impression of what those gaps represented began to 
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materialize, I discovered Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory. An influential though largely 
stagnated sociological theory which (when taken with a grain of salt) articulated quite well my 
conclusions on what ails the contemporary development enterprise. I draw heavily from 
Giddens’ approaches to conceptions of agency, structures, institutions and structuration theory in 
the formulation of the analytical framework advocated in this paper though my application of 
these concepts into a broader theoretical whole is distinct. This thesis resides on the peripheries 
of post-modernisation theory in that I focus on more than just growth in economic sectors of a 
state in pursuit of development goals. I do however, remain wary of framing development as an 
iterative process towards a defined ‘end’ since the theoretical basis on which this thesis is 
founded is one which defines progress in development as an inherently subjective endeavour.  
With this thesis, I offer analytical concepts for pre- and post-intervention research and 
analysis which can in turn inform the design of development interventions that account for (or at 
least take into consideration) a recipient state’s structural and institutional parameters in the 
pursuit of program success. These concepts are developed as tools designed to respond to 
questions of aid effectiveness proposed by the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008) (Organisation for Economic Development, n.d.). The thesis is divided into two 
parts, with part one detailing the problem and part two detailing my contribution through case 
study analysis. The next chapter offers an introduction to contemporary development theory and 
practice and establishes how the difficulties associated with defining development affects the 
difficulties associated with development practice. Chapter two exposes the complexity of 
development practice and the relationship between theory and practice. Chapter three introduces 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, the normative 
thrust of which I adopt in this paper. The rest of the chapters focus on my contribution to the 
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literature. Chapter four outlines the theoretical component of the approach advocated in this 
paper, structuration theory. I also apply the theory to assess the quality of popular development 
policy tools. Chapter five introduces and analyses five case studies of World Bank programs in 
accordance with the theory advocated here. The final and concluding chapter develops further 
my contribution through a broad roadmap on how practitioners may conduct their pre-
intervention research using the theory developed in this paper.  
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PART ONE: THE PROBLEM, THEORY AND PRACTICE 
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY AND INTRODUCTION TO DONOR-DRIVEN 
DEVELOPMENT 
Development is a vast, cross-disciplinary, and often ambiguous field of study. Despite 
nearly a century of formalized development practice, there is still little contemporary consensus 
on what distinguishes a developing state from a developed state (OECD, 2006). Before delving 
into the core of my argument, I will attempt to lessen this ambiguity for the purposes of my 
paper while highlighting the scope and limitations of contemporary definitions.  
Objective v. subjective aspects to development  
There are several ways to conceptualize development. In this section, I establish a binary 
categorization to begin with and further dissect the concept for the purposes of this paper. 
Objective aspects of development theory and practice appeal to universal ideas of what it means 
to be a ‘developed’ state and appeal to quantifiable indicators such as GDP per capita, or income 
demographics in order to make assessments on a state’s development status, trajectory, and 
prospects.  
Objective aspects of development theory and practice assume that there is a ‘start’ and an 
‘end’ to the development process: every state is ‘developed’ once it achieves (and can 
sustainably maintain) a certain threshold of objective and measurable progress in key institutions 
or sectors. Often, objective aspects make use of economic indicators to gauge the developmental 
progress a state has made. In practice, objective aspects include attempting to first establish 
successful models of development in a recipient state and then attempting to replicate these 
successful development programs from one state or region to other parts of the developing 
world. These models target certain sectors as development priorities and operate on the objective 
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assumptions of what prerequisites are necessary to develop a state through appeal to some of the 
quantifiable indicators mentioned earlier  
Much like with objective aspects of development, subjective aspects conceive of the 
‘development’ of a state as a fluid process that can manifest in a variety of ways depending on 
the state in question. Subjective aspects of development also take time and space into 
consideration, acknowledging that what qualifies as ‘development’ at one point in history may 
not ‘keep’ when compared to what qualifies as ‘development’ at another point in time or space. 
However, subjectivity in development may advocate unique state-specific paths to development 
or may prescribe different models of development based on the type of state in question. This 
typology can be based on region, economic model, regime type, or the abundance of natural 
resources the state has at its disposal. Subjectivity in development leaves room for a wide variety 
of development trajectories and narratives, each state travelling a different path or arriving at a 
different manifestation of what it means to be a developed state.  
Current development initiatives tend to combine subjective and objective aspects. For 
example, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a global set of priorities created by 
the UN for eradicating extreme poverty worldwide (United Nations, 2006). All signatory states 
commit to promote and implement the necessary measures to achieve quantifiable progress in the 
eradication of extreme poverty within their sovereign jurisdictions. These qualify in the 
categories articulated in this paper as an objective aspect of development practice given the 
universal definition of poverty that these goals are based on. However, in pursuing these goals, 
development practitioners will advocate different subjective approaches to poverty eradication 
given their resources, the type of program they perceive as the most effective in achieving the 
MDGs and the context in which they are operating. The commitments for the MDGs expired in 
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2015 and have now been extended and improved upon through the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) which are referenced in Paris and Accra (Sachs, 2012).  
Acknowledging that some degree of objectivity is absolutely necessary in being able to 
measure progress in a state’s developmental condition, I focus predominantly on the subjective 
‘method’ of development employed by practitioners to achieve their goals. I endorse a hybrid 
approach to development in this paper and develop a procedure for assessing a development 
problem and designing an appropriate intervention through reference to a recipient states’ 
structural and institutional configuration. 
Defining Development  
Contemporary development studies feature a number of different definitions in use or in 
evolution based on the thematic approach the theorist or practitioner deems most important. Still, 
these thematic definitions have rarely been distilled or combined successfully to make a 
cohesive, generalizable whole. Even the United Nations—the global powerhouse of norm 
dissemination—is unable to offer a cohesive definition. The World Bank, which is a global 
leader in development practice and intervention in the developing world and whose case program 
documents I will be analyzing in the second part of this paper, has also failed to provide a 
definition of development. Instead, both organizations elect to dissect development into more 
manageable thematic definitions: human, economic, sustainable, environmental etc. Of course, 
development practice has, for much of contemporary history, been defined and authoritatively 
conducted by the West. This presumptuousness that has pervaded much of development theory 
and practice paradoxically informs both the idea of ‘development’ as it is often conceived of by 
practitioners and theorists as well as the definition of the contemporary problems in 
development. In an attempt to demonstrate this irony, Gilbert Rist offers a particularly pithy 
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definition of development: “Development consists of a set of practices, sometimes appearing to 
conflict with one another, which require—for the reproduction of society—the general 
transformation and destruction of the natural environment and of social relations. Its aim is to 
increase the production of commodities (goods and services) geared, by way of exchange, to 
effective demand.” (Rist, 1997, p. 13). 
Through this definition, Rist offers commentary on the effectively destructive process of 
‘development’ as conducted and theorized by leading development practitioners, generally based 
in or informed by, the normative ‘West’. This definition while dripping with disdain for the field, 
actually offers a particularly concise conceptualization of current failures of development as a 
practice and reflects much of the frustration that has prompted my current study.  
Social, Economic, Political, Human, Sustainable Approaches to Development  
Having established the objective/subjective binary categorization of different aspects of 
development theory and practice, it is possible to dissect the term further. Depending on whether 
the focus is on social, economic, political, environmental or sustainable indicators of 
development, we are exposed to a number of different conceptions of what it means to be 
‘developed.’ It is important to note here that even definitions of specific thematic approaches to 
development vary greatly. As such, I offer one pre-established definition per theme as a base 
definition but acknowledge that every definition offered below has been scrutinized, critiqued, 
and even fallen out of use. The intention behind offering one admittedly fairly random (given the 
proliferation of definitions in current usage) definition is to impress upon the reader the general 
thrust of each approach in terms of its targets and conceptualization of development.  
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Social sector-centric approaches to development  
Social development focuses on the social prerequisites that promote growth in the social 
sectors. This approach derives its measure of success by looking at how the people subject to 
‘development’ are affected by it. The assumption is that if the experiences of people (and society 
as a whole) can be targeted for development, other sectors of the state will benefit. While these 
sectoral distinctions are useful for practitioners in one sense, they obscure the inter-
connectedness of different forms of development and serve to confuse initiatives and make 
development progress difficult to measure. In an extensive study on social development, James 
Midgely offers one such definition of development: ‘a process of planned social change designed 
to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of 
economic ‘development’ (Midgley, 1995, p. 8). This definition illustrates both the approach 
Midgely advocates as well as the means by which he perceives this type of development need be 
achieved, namely economic development. This definition also illustrates effectively the difficulty 
in distinguishing the inter-connectedness of different approaches in development. The fact that 
Midgely includes another distinct developmental approach in his definition of social 
development speaks well to the fact that a holistic definition would be beneficial in both filling 
these conceptual gaps and reducing definitional overlaps.  
Social-centric indicators of development can focus on health indicators, rates and quality 
of education, gender parity, and rates of conflict within the state. Health indicators can include 
rates of malnourishment among the population, rates of child and maternal death, prevalence of 
epidemic-level diseases, health risks the population is subject to, and quality and level of access 
to health care. Education can also offer insight on the level of state development, this includes: 
rates of literacy among the population, percentage of children in primary school, costs of 
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education, the number of post-secondary institutions in the state, and quality and level of access 
to education. Additionally, gender parity is increasingly recognized as a telling indicator of state 
development since this cross-cuts many of the other social indicators for example, the gendered 
disparities of rates of education or access to health. Another useful measure for gender parity is 
through assessment of the legal processes and guarantees featured in the state and the degree to 
which the reliability of these guarantees deviates in relation to men and women. Assessing rates 
of conflict within the state can also signal developmental prospects for a state. Paul Collier has 
written extensively on the correlations between economic growth/stagnation and prospects for 
civil war (Collier, 2000). However there is a hierarchy of types of conflict and their influence on 
assessing degrees of development. For example, violent civil war/conflict based on ethnic, 
religious, or sectarian divisions is a far more potent indicator of a state that is still developing 
than non-violent political disunity or conflict that is common in developed states.  
Economic-centric approaches to development 
Approaches to development that focus on the economy assess developmental progress 
through analysis of economic indicators of the state in question. Through appeal to free market 
principles, the assumption here is that economic development promotes positive, trickle-down 
growth in other sectors. This means that figures such as GDP, GDP per capita, GNP, average 
income, and sector specific economic profiles are factored in when formulating a development 
policy intervention. The intervention can focus on improving economic efficiency in certain 
sectors, lowering barriers to trade, establishing new trade relationships, introducing new 
economic policies and can inform national economic policy. As has been noted by many 
academics in the field, economic growth and economic development are often used 
interchangeably, as Linda Hauner notes, this informs the approaches to development advocated 
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in the field of development (Hauner, 2008, p. 7). A prominent assumption in the economics of 
development is that the condition of ‘underdevelopment’ is symptomatic of inefficiencies in the 
way domestic markets and the economic sector operates. If recipient states can reform their 
economy and markets, the other cross-sectoral features of development will be promoted as well.  
The field of development economics focusses specifically on the economies of 
developing states and theorists and practitioners approach these states with a diagnostic eye and 
it is most frequently associated with Albert Otto Hirschman (Hirschman, 1958). Development 
economics has been recognized as much of the ideological underpinning of the Post-Washington 
Consensus (Fine, 2006, p. 7). This is contrasted with ‘economic development’, the principles and 
theories of which are presumed to apply universally and which examines methods and 
implications of generating economic growth, locally, nationally, regionally, and globally. The 
more general ‘economic development’ is defined by Lorenzo G. Bellu on behalf of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as; ‘improvement of the way endowments and 
goods and services are used within (or by) the system to generate new goods and services in 
order to provide additional consumption and/or investment possibilities to the members of the  
‘system’ (Bellu, 2011, p. 3); Development economics on the other hand, while lacking a general 
definition, combines economics with development studies in an attempt to ‘provide a 
mathematical model of core-periphery  ‘development’ (Fine, 2006, p. xix). The aspirational 
mathematical modelling of core-periphery development has however fallen under severe scrutiny 
in recent years. The most vocal opponent of development economics and its thus-far failed 
attempts to model core-periphery relationships is Paul Krugman, who argues that development 
economics (or as he refers to it, ‘high development theory’) is in crisis due to this very inability 
to model what is being theorized (Krugman, 1994).  
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An alternative, more radical economics-centric approach to development that does not 
prescribe to either the Washington or Post-Washington Consensus is not limited to, but is well 
exemplified by, Dambisa Moyo’s controversial book Dead Aid. In ‘Dead Aid’, Moyo argues that 
most of the orthodox tools of development advocated by the World Bank and IMF are 
exacerbating the realities of underdevelopment in recipient states. She limits her analysis to the 
African continent but her claims transcend geography and offer a radical alternative to dominant 
consensus’ in development practice. Moyo offers a compelling account of current failings in the 
logic and practice in the field of development and the approach promoted in this paper is in 
agreement with much of her exposition of problems in development. However, Moyo’s analysis 
of current crises in development leads her to conclude that much of the development ‘product’ 
that is being received by the developing world is defective and thus must be discontinued, 
hypothetically within 5-10 years (Moyo, 2009, p. 76). The policy recommendations advocated in 
part two of this paper are far more optimistic about the potential of current development tools at 
the practitioner’s disposal.  
Political approaches to development  
Approaches to development that focus on the political features of the state in question 
identify regime type, electoral processes, degree of transparency, leadership, and governance as 
key indicators of developmental success. Development practitioners may target political 
mechanisms for succession, for example electoral processes, for reform. They may also support 
the development of oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency in democratic elections. 
Corruption is perhaps the most significant and nebulous issue that development practitioners 
target for mitigation in the developing state context since it can be identified as exacerbating any 
and all state-wide economic/political/social processes that are targeted for improvement.  
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Many development theorists envision the establishment of democracy within a struggling 
recipient state context as a panacea for chronic underdevelopment, the assumption is that 
democracy is an objectively superior political mechanism by which the will of the people is 
represented and manifested. Democracy is assumed to be the prerequisite for other advancements 
in a state that lead to developmental progress. Prominent economist Hernando de Soto and 
director of International Programs at the Instituto Libertad y Democracia Deborah Orsini 
articulate this quite effectively in a brief article detailing puzzles in development, 
Democracy encourages the participation of interested citizens in government decisions. 
Democracy allows politicians to do what they are mandated to do—not what they think is 
their royal prerogative. The crux of democracy is government by the people and for the 
people. (De Soto & Orsini, 1991, p. 112) 
De Soto has written extensively on the indispensability of democracy as a prerequisite and 
necessary component for social development and economic growth in the developing world.  
Another significant thematic focus of development theory is on the political leadership in 
the recipient state targeted for intervention. This discussion of leadership manifests in two 
notable ways in the literature: leadership as an independent variable to promote in development, 
or as a dependent variable that is influenced through development interventions.  
First, theorists treat political leadership as a variable that can intervene in the 
effectiveness of a development intervention in a number of ways. In the literature, this can mean 
that political leadership in the recipient state can be supportive of a development intervention or 
can impose conditionalities or limits on the degree of effectiveness of the intervention. James 
Raymond Vreeland discusses this at length in his paper ‘The IMF and Economic Development’ 
in which he argues that political will is a complicating factor in planned interventions. Political 
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will is complicated due to the fact that it is necessary to ensure program effectiveness but it also 
sometimes contributes to elite interests, the argument is that political elites decide to appeal to 
the IMF for intervention in the form of loans or programs because they perceive the intervention 
as strengthening their position in society (Vreeland, 2008, p. 353). Vreeland goes on to argue 
that while political will is necessary to improve prospects for successful development 
interventions, IMF interventions should target political reformers as the agents by which the 
programs or loans are disbursed (Vreeland, 2008, p. 366). 
 A second conclusion regarding political leadership in development treats it as a 
dependent variable in the impact of interventions. This literature contends that political 
leadership may become dependent on constant flows of loan monies and programmatic 
assistance. The assumption here is that when recipient state leadership is given access to large 
volumes of capital through external agencies, they become less answerable to local constituents. 
In a democratic context, theory dictates that political leadership is beholden to deliver on election 
promises, specifically on promises of economic growth since state administration relies on 
capital (either through taxation of constituents or through economic activity). This feedback loop 
which features some degree of guarantee on political accountability can be significantly 
diminished when political leadership establishes a donor-recipient relationship with the IMF 
since the reliance on constituents for fiscal capacity is eroded (Moss, Pettersson, & Van de 
Walle, 2008, p. 269). 
A brief note on the literature on corruption in the developing state context which is 
widely recognized within social sciences as being systemically contagious. By this, I mean that 
corruption does not tend to stay localized within one local geographic space within the recipient 
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state or within one sector of the state. A particularly insightful excerpt from a 4th century Indian 
treatise exposes the complexity of the problem contending with rampant corruption, 
‘Just as it is impossible not to taste the honey (or the poison) that finds itself at the tip of 
the tongue, so it is impossible for a government servant not to eat up, at least, a bit of the king's 
revenue. Just as fish moving underwater cannot possibly be found out either as drinking or not 
drinking water, so government servants employed in the government work cannot be found out 
(while) taking money (for themselves)’ (R. P. Kangle 1972, p. 91). 
As such, there is yet to be a compelling and applicable theorization of a potential ‘cure’ 
for the problem of corruption. Regardless, valuable efforts have been made to map out the extent 
to which corruption exists and persists in states, both developed and developing. 
Environmental/Sustainable approaches to development  
Environmental considerations are becoming increasingly prominent for development 
practitioners, developing states, and the developed states which interact with them. There is 
growing recognition that the forerunners for growth in the developing world, the BICs (Brazil, 
India, and China) all incur huge environmental costs as an externality of their impressive growth 
rates. Many of these states incur these costs as a result of MNCs from the developed world 
taking advantage of lax environmental regulations in the recipient state (Osabuohien, Efobi, & 
Gitau, 2015, p. 132).  
However, some argue that the recipient state itself is a source of the problem. For much 
of their developmental story, developing states have had other concerns such as famine, civil 
war, dictatorial leadership, etc. these take precedence and national priorities are naturally 
different from state to state. It must also be stressed that the developed world as it exists today 
has only achieved developmental progress through a necessary phase of excessive carbon 
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expenditure through the use of dirty oil, coal, and other cheap sources of energy. It is only 
through this lower cost, higher growth model that the developed world can claim the benefit of 
their relative success and that the developing world must also be afforded that freedom. Clean 
energy is costly and requires technical expertise with significant proportions of GDP being 
diverted for research and development. Therefore, many argue that environmental considerations 
are a luxury that only the developed world can afford.  
The discussion on the implications of development for the environment is complex and 
on a thematic level features issues of: climate justice, responsibility, blame, and moral normative 
impositions by the West of what is perceived by the developing world to be a luxury. At a 
practical level, discussions revolve around the most suitable policy tool by which the effects of 
climate change are mitigated globally, these include: cap and trade, carbon taxes, and R&D into 
green technologies (this includes discussion on patents).  
Conceptual issues surrounding policy application features most significantly, discussions 
on whether the developing world should bear the responsibility for the current climate change 
crisis, or whether the developed world should bear the responsibility for past pollutive sins that 
have contributed to contemporary environmental issues (Eberlein & Matten, 2009). This is well 
exemplified by the analysis of local blame in the small island state of the Marshall Island 
detailed by Peter Rudiak-Gould. The Marshall Islands and other small island states like the 
Maldives bear the brunt of the negative impact of climate change. As sea levels rise, the 
recognition of climate change and the externalities of unchecked environmental depletion is, in 
many places in the developed world, an abstract concept. The observable and very real 
destruction that climate change has wrought on small island states places them at the front line of 
a conflict they contributed to minimally at best (Rudiak-Gould, 2014). 
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Who does development? External development vs. internal development  
The process of state development can be further categorized based on whether the agents 
who engage in development originate within the state or outside of it. Externally directed 
development work can encompass a wide range of agents including: donors, World Bank/IMF 
officials, NGOs, NPOs, technocrats, field personnel etc. These agents can range from a wide 
variety of professional, cultural, national and ethno-religious backgrounds. These backgrounds 
inform their normative inclinations, their values, their assessment of the development challenges 
and their motivations for engaging them.  
Analyzing internally directed development work is a bit more nebulous. The line between 
agent contributions to ‘develop’ the state and agent contributions to day to day state functions, is 
blurred on various levels and raises a number of questions that are often left unanswered in 
development practice. First, do intentions matter? Second, is there recognition domestically that 
the state is ‘developing’ and what priority is placed on addressing this? Third, does all state 
activity within a developing state context affect that ‘developing state’ status? Lastly, at what 
point are domestic agents engaging in state development and at which point are they engaging in 
the normalized day to day activity of the state in question? 
If we assume the position that all state activity within a developing state context 
contributes in one way or another to the degree of ‘development’, then we must conclude that all 
activity within the developing state context affects that ‘developing state’ status regardless of 
whether it is day-to-day state activity and processes or not. This has important implications for 
who qualifies as an agent of development. Based on this assumption, a fruit vendor in rural 
Bangladesh contributes in the same way (albeit on a potentially smaller scale) to the country’s 
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degree of development as a government official introducing trade liberalisation reforms at the 
national level.  
Alternately, if we accept that intentions do matter and that a state and domestic agents 
must decide to engage in development, then we must first deduce whether state agents in 
question are cognizant of their country’s degree of development. We must then ascertain whether 
there exists (national or local-level) impetus to further ‘develop’ the state. There may also exist 
counter-intentionality among domestic agents who may disagree about the degree to which their 
state is ‘developing’ or the routes being advocated as means to promote state development.  
This debate also hints at the complexity of issues of attribution when discussing 
development ‘successes’ and ‘failures’. If a state that has some degree of domestic agent 
capacity also hosts external development agents then it is an immensely complicated task to 
determine causality between external agent activity and developmental success vs. 
internal/domestic agent activity and developmental success. This complication is also evident 
when assessing failures in development. Is progress in a state’s development the result of 
external intervention or is it the result of a natural (or concerted) effort on the part of domestic 
agents?  
Informed development or efficient development? 
The debates revolving around: objective vs. subjective aspects of development work, the 
role of external and internal agents in state development, and the problem of attribution of 
development success/failure; are represented in the ‘doing’ of development. There are several 
ways agents can ‘do’ development. 
Depending on whether they focus more heavily to the objective or subjective aspects of 
development theory and practice, or a hybrid of both, development agents have a number of tools 
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at their disposal with which to ‘do’ development. An implication of objectivity in development is 
that according to this approach, not only is there a start and end to development, there is also a 
correct and incorrect way to achieve that development ‘end’. Therefore, as long as development 
agents or practitioners have the ‘end’ in sight and the ‘correct’ route with which to embark on 
that journey, deviations from that route are only relevant insofar as they help practitioners gauge 
how best to ‘right’ a developing state’s incorrect trajectory. In other words, regional, national, or 
local conceptualizations of what constitutes development and how to do it, become less relevant 
when diagnosing and prescribing solutions to a state’s failed development enterprise. This 
becomes a useful approach for external development agents since context becomes less relevant 
when operating in states they are not familiar with. The burden of knowledge is less of an 
impediment.  
Implications of the subjective components of development theory and practice are that 
due to the importance of regional, national and local contexts in informing the policy tools that 
are used to promote development, agents and practitioners must in a sense ‘start from scratch’ 
every time they embark on a new development initiative. The assumption that there is no 
‘correct’ way to do development, means that expertise in the field is far more elusive. This 
makes the ‘doing’ of development a more complicated task. There are fewer tried and true policy 
tools at your disposal, successes are more difficult to define and measure, and therefore, there are 
no guarantees. While there are undoubtedly proponents of objective routes to development 
within developing states, subjectivity is harder to avoid in the domestic context. The closer 
development agents and practitioners are to the problem, the more information they are privy to. 
The more information they are subject to, the more information they deem relevant. The greater 
their knowledge of domestic context, the heavier the burden. This is not to suggest that 
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practitioners are advocating ignorance, rather, the incentives to pursue specialized knowledge is 
minimal. In effect, many practitioners operate with impunity within this policy space of minimal 
specialized knowledge.  
The perception of trade-offs between objectivity and subjectivity when it comes to state 
development can be summarized in the following dichotomy: effective development through 
efficiency (freedom from the burden of knowledge) or effective development through specialized 
knowledge (greater informational input reduces the risk of oversight or incorrect assumptions).  
How to do development: Development policy tools  
Keeping the influence of different approaches in mind, we can identify a number of 
different policy tools with which practitioners honour their visions for the state in question. 
Policy tools practitioners employ to enact their development agendas can include: loans, grants, 
programs and expertise; in isolation or combined with other tools.  
Loans 
Historically speaking, loans are one of the most popular policy tools development 
practitioners have employed. The institutionalized use of loans to influence (development or 
other) outcomes in states dates back to the period immediately after World War II. The 
devastation the war wrought on Europe impressed upon the United States the benefit a large 
injection of capital would have on reconstruction efforts. The United States having a vested 
interest in the economic health of Europe and being largely shielded from the destructive effects 
of the war, was the prime candidate to spearhead the initiative. Thus, Europe reaped the benefits 
of the Marshall Plan which featured a total disbursement of 13.15 billion dollars for the purposes 
of reconstruction and economic stimulus ( (Price, 1955, p. 88). At the same time, discussions 
were underway for the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions; what are today known as 
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the IMF and the World Bank The raison d’etre for the World Bank was to facilitate 
reconstruction and capital investment and the IMF was established to manage the global 
financial system (Moyo, 2009). The Marshall plan and the Bretton Woods institutions worked 
together successfully to reconstruct and repair European institutions and to reset development in 
the region back to its pre-war trajectory.  
Modern usage of loans for the purposes of development has evolved significantly from its 
earliest manifestations. Today, institutions and states that offer loans to the developing world do 
so in a variety of ways. Loans can be: conditional, tied, bilateral, multilateral etc; and all of them 
of course have be repaid. Conditional loans to developing states are quantities of cash or capital 
that are accompanied with enforceable caveats and restrictions on either how the money is used 
or on how the developing state must operate prior to qualifying for initial or subsequent tranches 
of the loan (Agostino, 2008). Tied aid is a type of loan that limits the recipient state to 
conducting business or signing contracts for sectoral reform or development with the donor state. 
Contracts for transportation infrastructure development for example must be offered to 
construction companies from donor states (Abe & Takarada, 2005). Bilateral loans are 
exchanged between a donor state and a recipient state with little to no intervention or input from 
multilateral organizations like the IMF or the WB. Bilateral loans are employed for a variety of 
reasons and necessarily establish a ‘special’ relationship between the recipient and the donor 
states. Bilateral loans can be offered for geo-strategic purposes (ie. to establish allies in a 
strategic position) or can be offered to maintain historical relationships between states (ie. former 
colonies). Multilateral loans involve institutions like the IMF and WB and generally feature a 
pooling of risk between member states (typically from the developed world) who contribute 
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percentages of capital to the final loan amount to be disbursed to developing states (Brech & 
Potrafke, 2014).  
Grants 
Grants are offered in much the same way loans are but are issued without the burden of 
repayment. This form of aid is gaining more traction since rising backlash in the 80s and 90s 
against harsh interest rates and crippling levels of debt among recipient states in the developing 
world (IMF, 2005). The billions of dollars’ worth of loans that have flowed to the developing 
world since 1945 have been accompanied by even greater amounts of debt for the very 
developing world that the loans were meant to help. The huge amounts of debt incurred by 
developing states compounds and exacerbates the plight of the developing state that was targeted 
for improvement in the first place.  
Programs/Projects 
Another policy tool used by aid practitioners is that of programmatic aid. Aid programs 
(appears to be used interchangeably in the literature with ‘projects’) can take a multitude of 
forms depending on the focus and approach the engineer of the program prescribes to. 
Programmatic aid provides financial, technical and organisational resources to a developing 
state. Using these resources program engineers develop a program to be implemented in the 
developing state. These programs are diverse in scope and focus. Some programs may target 
certain social sectors at the national level such as curriculum updates in the education sector or 
vaccination drives in the health sector. Others may be more local in scope, attempting to generate 
community-level growth through the building of a water pump in a municipality that does not 
have immediate access to water. Additionally, programs can be even more expansive and may 
feature a re-engineering of the economic model a state employs, for example SAPs which 
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attempted to implement neo-liberal economic policies within the developing states (SAPs 
comprised the conditional component to many loans in the 80s) (Gilbert, 2013).  
Expertise 
Another significant policy tool used by aid practitioners is that of expertise. This can be 
offered to recipient states in the developing world in the form of technocrats or technology. 
Conditional loans, grants, and programs may all be accompanied by diagnoses on what the 
recipient state needs to target for development and prescriptions for improvement (Hayes & 
Westrup, 2012). These diagnoses are generally conducted by experts in the fields that are 
targeted development. These technocrats are often trained in the context of the donor’s 
(institutional, NGOs, or state) normative climate.  
Another form of expertise is the donation of technology to recipient states. This is more 
frequently done by MNCs that target a developing state for investment. The MNC may erect a 
factory or administrative hub and import the necessary technology to ensure efficiency in 
process. The technology is often more advanced than the local models and patents for them are 
often protected as corporate secrets. Alternately the introduction of advanced technology or 
processes in the context of the developing state may spur technological evolution or innovation 
within local machinery or technology.  
Given the demonstrated complexity in defining what constitutes development, it is 
intuitive that development practice should also feature a great degree of fragmentation, 
disharmony, and fundamental ideological disagreements regarding the nature of the enterprise. In 
addition, the question of who an agent of development may be and what tools they have at their 
disposal in the context of ideological disagreements also contributes to the complexity of 
development practice and alludes to why it is crucial to establish a process by which this 
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complexity is not overlooked but managed. The next chapter further examines this 
disharmonious state of affairs by exposing conceptual puzzles in the practice of development.  
With this thesis, I elect a holistically subjective approach to development in that while 
my case studies focus on development initiatives that target the social sectors, I do not contend 
that the social sectors are more conducive to development progress. Additionally, in regards to 
progress, I adopt the approach of post-modernisation theorists in defining subjective 
development as the pursuit and attainment of a maximisation of quality of life and well-being for 
the peoples subject to that progress. I argue here that in order to attain this quality of life, agents 
of development must look to institutional health across all sectors within a recipient state. This 
incorporates all sectors, both external and internal agents of development and implicates 










CHAPTER TWO: PUZZLES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Why is development so complicated? 
Since the establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and 70 odd years of donor-
recipient relationships between the developed world and the developing world, countless lessons 
have been gleaned regarding what it means to ‘develop’ and how complex that process actually 
is. The initial optimism of the developed world for the plights (real or imagined) of the 
developing world has since faded considerably in the form of disillusionment and donor-fatigue. 
Billions of dollars and a variety of approaches to the multitude of problems were injected into the 
developing world and resulted in (occasional) improvement, stasis, or at worst, exacerbation of 
the problem. Faced with far too many instances of unsuccessful development initiatives and 
unproductive donor-recipient relationships, it became apparent to many in the field that 
development practitioners and theorists were in over their heads. Criticism of developed world 
interventions in the developing world rose. I will highlight some broad conceptual puzzles of the 
development enterprise as well as some broad practical puzzles in order to demonstrate the 
extent of the problem my proposed framework addresses: the ambiguity between development 
work and state-building, the inherent paternalism of externally directed development, program 
initiative overlap and counter-productivity.  
Conceptually speaking, there are a number of complex issues that must be reconciled (or 
at the very least, addressed) if the developed world is to guarantee effectiveness in its 
interventions in the developing world. First and foremost, the relationship between development 
work and state-building must be recognised and made explicit. The categories of ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ at their very core attempt to address questions of both state capacity and state 
sustainability. These are core considerations in the area of state building. Questions of what 
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constitutes a sustainable state and the capacity of that state to engage in self-sustaining behaviour 
are common considerations between state building and development literature. I contend that the 
conditions and features of the foundational elements of a state, its structures, are prescriptive of 
whether a state qualifies as ‘developed’ or ‘developing’, and that we must take into assessment 
the degree of structural change, growth, or maturity we are attempting to facilitate. This raises 
questions of sovereignty and ownership for developmental success or failure.  
Autonomy and ownership 
Development initiatives must take into consideration the degree to which practitioners are 
supporting, promoting, or subverting state autonomy. Recipient state governments often grant a 
considerable degree of autonomy to external development agencies to operate within the 
jurisdiction of the state. Development agencies can use this operational autonomy to set new, 
productive, precedents within a recipient state, irreversibly implicating the donor in that state’s 
processes. This is especially the case if those new and productive precedents are identified as 
being contingent on the donor’s involvement, the benefits that follow from donor intervention 
may be reversed if the donors withdraw after implementing the program. 
Development initiatives that require recipient state support, for example to perhaps 
implement new national economic policies, must recognize the degree of delegative and 
oversight processes that are implicated by the initiative in question and the practitioners. This 
consideration would allow for precautionary measures to be woven into the components of the 
initiative that could prevent backsliding into the pre-intervention conditions of the developing 
state in the event that the development agency withdraws, perhaps through reservation of key 
operational and influential roles for recipient state agents.  
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Questions of delegation, oversight and transparency also implicate issues of attribution 
and ownership for successes and failures. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to trace 
developmental success to dedicated ‘development’ work or organic, internal state processes. As 
Banerjee and He note,  
When we do something and things look as if they are getting better, it is tempting to think 
that it was all because of what we did. The problem is that we have no way of knowing 
what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. (Banerjee & He, 2008, p. 
57) 
Only through appeals to counterfactuals can theorists speculate on causality. When a 
development outcome is achieved, the implications for state autonomy when external 
practitioners take ownership for the success are significant.  
Paternalism 
Another significant conceptual issue that is prevalent in all externally driven development 
work is that of paternalism. There are volumes written on the ‘white man’s burden’ and Western 
interventions in the developing world. The white man’s burden is the assumed responsibility of 
the ‘white’ ‘west’ to liberate, educate, and civilize the peoples of the developing world (Tripathy, 
2011, p. 110). The problem of paternalism is well-documented in Maria Eriksson Baaz’s book 
‘The Paternalism of Partnership’ in which she highlights Western assumptions of recipient state 
‘backwardness’. These assumptions are evident in accounts of development practice in which 
recipient states are described and admonished as being childlike. Theorists and practitioners who 
subscribe to the idea that development occurs in stages may offer analyses featuring paternalistic 
statements such as ‘they are not ready yet’ and harbour pessimism towards a region’s potential 
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for growth (Baaz, 2005, p. 42). In this conceptualization of the developing world, the Western 
world is cast as the only qualified director of development efforts.  
This ‘white man’s burden’ mentality is evident in many of the objective elements of 
development when practitioners attempt to emulate the ‘developed’ ideal of the West and assume 
technical authority on how best to replicate this in the developing state context. The more recent 
export of democracy is yet another manifestation of the white man’s burden. This paternalism 
takes many forms and inherently underscores most of the donor-driven development enterprise. 
The white man’s burden assumes responsibility for development, placing the onus on donors in 
the West for failures and acknowledges Western efforts for successes. The prominent economist 
turned development theorist, William Easterly has written extensively on this topic and positions 
himself in opposition to development orthodoxy both of theory and practice. During the course 
of my research, I waded through one particularly illuminating edited volume of his however and 
found curious contradictions in his critical approach. In ‘Reinventing Foreign Aid’, Easterly 
offers an account of a number of practical and theoretical crises contemporary development work 
faces. The volume is categorized into five conceptual parts: evaluations, interacting with 
recipient state governments, donor failings, the IMF and the World Bank, and imagining new 
forms of foreign aid. The result is admittedly introspective and self-critical but in the most 
paradoxical way. Easterly and his contemporaries’ brand of self-reflection is so loaded with 
hubris it is almost miraculous in its ignorance. Given that Easterly and co. seem to acknowledge 
that development is in crisis, the book features a puzzling amount of round-about self-
congratulation as well. For example, terms like ‘savvy altruists’, ‘true believers’, ‘brilliant well-
meaning people’, ‘ten smart people’, ‘high-quality technocrats’ and ‘planners’ vs the more 
admirable ‘searchers’ are frequent and are used predominantly to refer to the external, 
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predominantly Western aid practitioner or theorist (Easterly, 2008). Treatment of the recipient on 
the other hand is far less generous with discussions like Ritva Reinikka’s on ‘increasing recipient 
power’, ‘training’ donors, ‘promoting citizen voice’, or Bertin Marten’s discussion on imposing 
conditionalities on loans that apply punitive pressure to recipient governments, as one would a 
misbehaving child who does not know any better and must be taught how to spend her money 
(Easterly, 2008, pp. 179, 289). The common theme treats external development practitioners as 
benevolent parents to an inept, incapable recipient state. The implication is that even when 
external practitioners have demonstrated time and time again that they are often normatively and 
practically ill-equipped to intervene effectively within a recipient state’s context, the onus must 
remain on practitioners to improve. The possibility that recipients employ inherent agency and 
capacity is precluded since, according to Easterly et al., recipient states are at the end of the day 
underdeveloped through their own ineptitude. This leaves little room for recipient state 
autonomy or ownership for the successes or failures of the development initiatives. The inherent 
and problematic paternalism of externally-directed development work must however be 
reconciled with the fact that external agents possess the resources and capacity that is lacking in 
the developing state context.  
Efforts have been made to mitigate this paternalistic streak through an increasing number 
of domestic partnerships with local experts and field staff. However many have noted that these 
partnerships are often more lip service than a substantial, meaningful effort being made by 
external development practitioners (Baaz, 2005, p. 6). The degree of autonomy and authority that 
domestic partners have varies. While limited, efforts are being made to expand the role of 
domestic partners. Nevertheless, externally directed development initiatives often feature 
external agents in key decision-making roles.  
33 
Initiative overlap and Fratricide  
In practice, another set of development puzzles become evident. With the multitude of 
external, internal, multi/bilateral, organisational, and individual level development agents 
operating within one policy space, the risk for redundancy and counter-productivity is ever 
present. A development initiative may overlap jurisdictionally, conceptually, or in terms of 
outcome. A hypothetical (but quite common in practice) example of this is a program developed 
by an NGO that promotes higher rates of female enrollment in primary school education. 
Simultaneously there may be a nation-wide program that also promotes increased rates of female 
enrollment. This can result in either complementary interaction between the NGO’s program and 
the national program or an increased risk that the NGO program may become redundant in the 
context of the national program. Both programs may have the same outcomes in mind and the 
same tools employed to achieve this outcome, the difference is that the nation-wide program 
with the administrative, financial, and technical advantage will make the NGO’s program 
redundant. This results in a misuse of resources and time on the part of the NGO that may be of 
better service filling a gap in the national policy agenda and also is demonstrative of a collective 
action problem as detailed by Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman,  
From the perspective of the recipient country’s welfare, incentives for any one donor to 
shirk on activities that maximize overall development in favour of activities that 
contribute to donor-specific goals strengthen as the number of donors increases. Donors’ 
multiple and conflicting objectives exacerbate this basic collective action problem. 
Donors are undoubtedly in most or all cases concerned with development of the recipient 
country, but must trade this objective off against other goals as well, such as commercial 
and security objectives. (Knack & Rahman, 2008, p. 334) 
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Another challenge development practitioners face is when development initiatives 
overlap to produce contradictory or counter-productive outcomes. Two development agencies 
may be operating in the same policy space and the activity of one may undermine the success of 
the other. For example, an organisation may have crafted an initiative for polio eradication in a 
certain region, while another organisation, with different approaches to health may have crafted 
an education initiative for why the polio vaccine is actually ineffective and exacerbates other 
health issues. The latter being more effective in the implementation of their education program 
may win favour among the population in the policy space and therefore the success of the former 
is undermined. This disunity in development goals and outcomes can be caused by different 
philosophies or different data packages and information that lead each agent to arrive at different 
conclusions regarding the polio vaccine.  
Conceptualising and measuring success/failure in development 
Failures in development initiatives are frequent and can vary in scale and impact. A 
failure can be gauged in terms of the ineffectiveness of a program or initiative to contribute to 
the desired development outcome. A failure can also be gauged in terms of the degree to which a 
program actually contributes to a worsening of the pre-program conditions. Failures of both 
kinds occur regularly in the field. This is not in itself damning, after all, assessment of past 
failures can prove fruitful in the improvement of future programs, can help correct incorrect 
assumptions and contribute to the base of knowledge the practitioner has at their disposal. What 
is damning and reprehensible is when practitioners engage in development work without 
sufficient base research on the absorptive capacity of the recipient state for the development 
intervention they are advocating.  
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An example of this is the building of a water pump in a community that’s only other 
source of water comes from the women of the community travelling by foot for four hours (often 
with their school-age daughters in tow) to the nearest river bed to haul water back to the 
community for cooking, cleaning, bathing etc. (Vandendriessche, 2012). A development agency 
comes in with an innovative and marketable solution for a water pump. These ‘Playpumps’ were 
essentially modified merry-go-rounds which would tap into a water storage tank to siphon water 
out for the service of the community (Vandendriessche, 2012). The community historically 
lacked a space for the children to play, the Playpump hit two birds with one in this regard; 
providing water for the community and recreation for the children. Locals were trained in the 
proper maintenance of the program it even incorporated a revenue-creating mechanism by means 
of advertising on accompanying billboards. The program received massive international support 
and funding however after a few months passed, programs reviews were conducted and found 
that the Playpump program, for all of its promise had failed to generate the development 
outcomes envisioned (Vandendriessche, 2012). Among the failures of the program were the 
higher cost associated with the Playpump in comparison with a simple water pump, the failure of 
the billboards to attract revenue-generating advertisements, the unfeasibility of children being 
able to play for hours and hours on end in order to draw the requisite water volumes for 
community use, and the operational difficulty of the Playpump in comparison with a standard 
water pump. This last point was particularly damning when it was revealed that women of the 
community were forced to operate the Playpump to draw water when children were not playing 
in demeaning form and with greater difficulty than they would with a standard water pump 
(Vandendriessche, 2012).  
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This example represents a loss of revenue, time, and resources for the development 
agency as well as a burden for the women of the community and the community at large for not 
reaping any benefit from the lengthy program. Program failures like these are common in 
development work and effectively demonstrate the lack of information development agencies in 
the developing world have regarding the micro-level contexts for why a state exists in the form 
that it does (Stepanek, 2010).  
Successes in development are also frequent though, for the reasons detailed earlier, 
causality for why an initiative succeeds is often a complicated thing to determine. Successes can 
be gauged similarly in terms of the implementation of a program or in terms of the achievement 
of a broader development outcome that is the sum of a variety of programs, an agenda. 
Development agendas tend to be larger financial and temporal commitments in the recipient state 
and feature a variety of related development projects. An example of this is a wholesale reform 
of the financial sector in an effort to increase efficiency, this could include projects to weed out 
nepotism in order to re-instate more meritocratic hiring processes, enforcing mandatory internal 
auditing of firms, coupled with external technical consultation on how to improve processes. In 
addition to the issue of ownership, successes are often sporadic and tracing causality is 
complicated. Referencing the water pump example again, a developmental success could be 
simply that the water pump worked, the women were no longer burdened with the immense task 
of the four hour hike, and it is being used to this day. To be clear, this does happen and often 
(Ika, Diallo, & Thuillier, 2012). However what makes successes like these more difficult to work 
with is the fact that, as demonstrated with the water pump example, what works in one 
developing state context does not work in all contexts. There is an alarming tendency among 
external development practitioners to fall victim to the logical fallacy that suggests that if a 
37 
program has seen success in one context, that the success offers commentary on the quality of 
the program rather than on the appropriateness of the preconditions of the specific recipient state. 
A more expansive example of the failure of these cookie cutter prescriptions for the developing 
world is evident in the failure of structural adjustment programs in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
These SAPs featured a series of economic principles informed by the Washington consensus 
which prescribed to a more objective approach to development. The assumption is that the 
economic policies informed by the neoliberal Washington consensus were the reason for the 
successes of many of the formerly ‘developing’ states like the Asian tigers and much of the 
Western world. For example, according to global normative measures, successes such as those of 
the East Asian Tigers prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997 were emblematic of the 
effectiveness of Washington Consensus principles as reliable development tools. Of course, after 
the AFC, global normative assumptions on what is required to develop a state were reluctantly 
(and to a limited degree) revisited (Raffer, 2007, p. 2). By the end of the 80s and an 
overwhelming number of failures of SAPs, the Bretton Woods institutions recognised that 
unconditionally free markets were no longer the solution for developing states. While this 
realization was welcome, it was a long time coming, and that time was destructive for the 
developing states upon which these policies were imposed. 
Business-Client Culture in Development: Who is the client? 
A final comment on what constitutes successes and failures in development. As 
development work becomes an increasingly profit-driven undertaking, success and failures are 
becoming increasingly defined by the ability of a development agency to gain funding for a 
proposed program. For many of these agencies, success and failure starts and ends with the 
ability of an agency to attract donor funding for their various programs. This is unquestionably a 
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problematic development as far as the recipient state in the developing world is concerned. This 
raises questions as to who the appropriate client is and who they should be in the business of 
development. It is important to question who the client is in any developmental transaction 
between the developed and the developing world (Ika & Hodgson, 2014, p. 1187). 
If the client is the developing world, one can assume that the developing states and their 
governments should be able to ‘shop around’ for the best option. The degree to which this is true 
in practice is questionable. Developing state governments could assess which development 
agency and program can offer them the most returns for their dollar. But as has already been 
established, the reason that developing states and their governments appeal for developmental 
services, is because often they do not have the capital necessary to provide these services on their 
own. One can then perhaps rule out developing states and their governments as ‘clients’ in the 
context of the ‘agency as a business’ analogy. Further reason for why the developing state is not 
the client stems from the recognition that for much of the history of externally driven 
development work in the developing world, the developing world has been acted upon. 
Questions of agency seem to become secondary considerations the moment a state is identified 
as ‘developing’ and targeted for intervention. There is little room for agency in current 
conceptualisations of what a developing state is. Lastly, there exists a centuries old trend for 
donor-recipient state relationships based on strategic benefit that is skewed in favour of the 
donor. Countless contemporary iterations of this exist. We need only look to the decades old 
donor-recipient relationship between the US and Pakistan, a military alliance based on the geo-
strategic advantage of Pakistan to its neighbours (Boutton & Carter, 2014).  
Since casting the developing world as the client is dubious, can we infer that the 
development agency is the client? There are two possibilities here, first that the developing world 
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is the ‘seller’ or second that the donors who fund developing agencies are the ‘seller’. Evidence 
certainly does exist that suggests that developing states must make themselves as appealing as 
possible in order to garner the favour of the developed world. There are several development 
practitioners who argue that only certain developing states that demonstrate good behaviour and 
who possess some degree of capacity are worth intervening in (Easterly, 2008, p. 255). This 
means that developing states must ‘sell’ their credentials and capacity in order to receive the 
services of the development agency.  
As alluded to earlier, the importance of a sound ‘business model’ and the necessity of 
offering competitive services is becoming increasingly important for development agencies and 
practitioners (Martens, 2005, p. 11). One implication of this is that the responsibility to attract 
‘investors’ or donors is significant. This means that the donor is increasingly assuming the role 
of the client. The attractiveness of a development program is tailored to appeal to the donor 
rather than the developing state. This becomes problematic since often the donor’s idea of what 
makes an attractive development program is often less related to the viability or promise of the 
program for the recipient state and rather is related to how marketable the program is. Therefore, 
we can conclude that ‘success’ for a development agency as a business can often be at odds with 
‘success’ for a development agency as a contributor to development outcomes in the developing 
world. The incentive to review programs and improve upon past ones to create a better ‘product’ 
is no longer as compelling.  
Theory vs. Practice 
Surveying the dominant theories in development studies and the key issues in the 
discourse in comparison with the way development is practiced, an alarming trend becomes 
apparent. Development theory holds a fairly low presence in the practice. While some degree of 
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detachment between theories and practice is evident in most fields, when surveying literature 
from practicing development experts, it becomes apparent that there is often little to no dialogue 
with the theory whatsoever.  
Between World Bank program review reports and books like Easterly’s, it is evident that 
theory is less relevant. There are certainly exceptions to this claim and there is increasing 
attention by technocrats and practitioners being paid to incorporating theoretical frameworks to 
justify and substantiate their approaches to a particular development problem or the developing 
state in question. However, this study focusses on the instances in which this is not happening as 
such the proportions of theory-less programs in comparison with theorized programs is less 
relevant. As along as the trend persists, it is indicative of careless, poorly researched, wasteful 
and detrimental practice by development agents.  
Theories, Approaches, and Models for Development  
In addition to the reference to different approaches to development detailed in the first 
chapter, this thesis categorizes the literature in terms of theories, approaches, and models for 
development. To review, the approaches already detailed are: economic approaches, political 
approaches, social approaches, domestic approaches, and external approaches. Practitioners 
subscribe to a specific approach or a combination of them and consider their approach the most 
important one in achieving wholesale development across all sectors.  
Four broad theories have been particularly influential in development discourse over the 
decades. These theories are: modernization, dependency, world-systems theory, and 
globalization. Modernization theory suggests that there is a modern, developed end to be 
achieved by all states. In this conceptualisation, the west represents that modernity and that there 
are developmental phases that each state must undergo in order to achieve this (Engerman, 2003, 
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p. 63). Development practice that draws on this theory attempts to replicate these phases in the 
developing state in order to create a modern society. This is an example of an objective, 
Universalist approach to development, there is a definable, achievable end to the developmental 
process and there are concrete steps a state can and must take in order to arrive at this desirable 
end. Another implication of this approach is that the already modern, developed world has an 
inherent authority on what constitutes development to this end and how best to achieve it. This 
means that this theory also generally promotes the authority of externally directed development 
in the recipient state.  
Dependency theory conceptualizes states of development in regards to the types of 
relationships between the ‘core’ (read developed) states and the ‘periphery’ (read developing) 
states. This theory borrows heavily from Marxist theories and incorporates a strong economic 
component to prescriptions for development. The general logic of the theory asserts that the 
periphery states are maintained in a retrograde state due to an extractive relationship with the 
core states by which the core benefits from exploitation of the periphery. The asymmetrical 
power dynamic between the core and periphery means that the core (developed) states dictate 
who develops, how, and when (if at all) based on perceptions of potential benefit (Tausch, 2011, 
p. 468). The asymmetry between core-periphery is also replicated within the developing state 
itself, with a small elite benefiting from the relationship and power dynamic. At the inter-state 
level, the developing world is on the losing end of an extractive relationship with core states and 
at the sub-state level elites constitute or represent core interests and the non-elite majority 
constitute the periphery.  
World systems theory takes a far more holistic approach to development than the two 
previous theories. While dependency theory focusses on analysis of the ‘periphery’ and 
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economic components of periphery societies, world systems theory looks at the interactions 
between the core, semi-periphery, and the periphery in equal degrees. World systems theorists 
analyze these interactions and argue that there is no single traceable cause for different states of 
development and create room for the possibility that often degrees of underdevelopment are less 
the result of any feature of the state itself but can often be attributed to the other states that they 
interact with and the types of relationships they hold with these other often developed states. 
These theorists also incorporate several analytical conceptualizations of the state, social, political 
and economic in their claims and conclusions. This theory features a more subjective approach 
and blurs the internal and the external, claiming that they are mutual reinforcing and mutually 
implicated by relationships between states (Reyes, 2001).  
Lastly, theories of globalization also take a global analytical perspective and focus more 
on cultural components of societies and intercultural exchange as a crucial process of 
development. It has been noted that the fashionable ideas associated with globalisation have 
historically (and with a diminished profile) been featured in development studies (Eriksen, 2002, 
p. 423). Additionally, the systemic, transnational, and what are often ungovernable forces that 
are the subject of the study of globalisation, are noted as overlooking several areas of the world 
depending on the degree of development a state has achieved. What are acknowledged as being 
the most underdeveloped states in the world are also often overlooked by the positive aspects of 
globalisation (cross-cultural exchange, knowledge exchange, etc.) but tend to fall victim to the 
negative aspects of it (extractive trade relationships, norm imposition, neo-imperial forces) 
(Dohlman & Halvorson-Quevedo, 1997, p. 36) 
This paper positions itself at the peripheries of dependency theory and a post-
modernisation perspective, with post-modernisation theory doing most of the heavy lifting. 
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Where modernisation theory focusses predominantly on maximising economic growth in pursuit 
of more objective development ends, I incorporate a great deal of subjectivity into the 
conceptualisation of development progress endorsed here. Post-modernisation theory places 
greater emphasis on maximising quality of life rather than economic growth.  
In addition to theories of development there are also different focal points for how 
theorists recommend pursuing their theoretically-informed development goals. A few of these 
models are informed by: those that advocate the dominance of the state/government as a vehicle 
for development, those that advocate the role of business, free market, and the private sector as a 
vehicle for development, those that are informed by the Washington consensus and the neo 
liberalism of the 90s, and those that are informed by the newer post-Washington consensus.  
In summary, the complexity of development as a concept, as a practice and as advocated 
through different theories generates a great deal of diversity in externally-directed development 
interventions and in the normative foundations by which success and failure is assessed. This is 
not altogether unexpected, preventable, or necessarily a bad thing, given the global scope of the 
undertaking and the range of actors involved. The significant risk of malpractice and 
exacerbation of serious development issues is however reprehensible. It is not sufficient to 
acknowledge that development is complicated to ‘do’, there must be genuine interest in 
improving development practice and analyzing causes of intervention failure. The next chapter 
introduces two key documents that represent a normative shift toward recognising the 
responsibility of major development organisations like the World Bank to greater responsibility 
towards ensuring aid effectiveness: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra 




CHAPTER THREE: THE PARIS DECLARATION AND ACCRA AGENDA FOR 
ACTION 
Acknowledging the degree of complexity and disunity in the practice and theorisation of 
international development, the persistence of seemingly inexplicable failures has reached a 
saturation point that the international community can no longer ignore. In recent years, it has 
become difficult to dismiss the prevalence of failures in development practice and the lack of 
accountability on the part of development organisations, agencies and practitioners, in those 
failures. As pressure on multilateral normative and practical leaders in development mounts, the 
international community becomes increasingly persuasive in calls for a concrete and genuine 
shift in development practice orthodoxy. In response to this mounting pressure, the Organisation 
for Economic Development hosted a High Level Forum (HLF-2) in Paris in February 2005 with 
over 100 developed and developing countries in order to arrive at a consensus of sorts regarding 
the very pressing issues plaguing the promise of development aid. Three years later, a third High 
Level Forum on aid effectiveness (HLF-3) was held in 2008 in Accra with the purpose of 
furthering and strengthening the progress made at Paris.  
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was the result of HLF-2 in Paris in 2005 and 
is based on five principles by which adhering countries and organisations can improve the 
effectiveness of their aid efforts: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and 
mutual accountability. Optimistic about the potential of the declaration, the OECD describes the 
declaration as; 
45 
More than a statement of general principles, the Paris Declaration lays out a practical, 
action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It 
puts in place a series of specific measures for implementation and establishes 
performance indicators that assess progress. It also calls for an international monitoring 
system to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable – a feature that is 
unique among international agreements (OECD, 2008) 
So far so good. The declaration demonstrated at the very least a definitive shift in development 
thinking by some of the most influential multi-lateral donor organisations dealing with either 
monetary or programmatic aid.  
 The first principle of ‘ownership’ in the declaration addresses the detrimental practice by 
external development practitioners to defer to external authority in the context of aid program 
implementation within a recipient country. In the case of the World Bank, this means that prior 
to the Paris Declaration despite movement in the direction of recipient state ownership of a given 
development initiative, the practice of positioning elite or external technocrats in key oversight 
roles persisted. According to the OECD, the principle of ownership commits to the importance of 
developing countries taking ownership for their own poverty reduction strategies, the developing 
country must be the author of those strategies as well as the primary implementing agent of that 
strategy (OECD, n.d.) 
 The principle of ‘alignment’ is targeted to external donor countries and organisations to 
address the lack of cohesion with domestic development strategies and initiatives. In the case of 
the World Bank, this necessitates a shift away from external development and implementation of 
an aid program with little to no recognition or incorporation of domestic strategies and poverty-
reduction programs. The principle of alignment states that donor activity within a developing 
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country must be cohesive with domestic objectives and operate within local contexts (OECD, 
n.d.).  
 The third principle of ‘harmonisation’ is again directed at external donors with the intent 
of mitigating the potential for duplication in aid programs when donors do not collaborate with 
one another to simplify processes and share information (OECD, n.d.). As one of the largest 
multilateral aid organisations, the World Bank has implemented a cumulative 12,682 projects in 
173 countries since 1947 to the present day (World Bank, n.d.). While it can be assumed that 
harmonisation of programs within the World Bank’s scope of activity in a developing country is 
a given, the same scrutiny is not applied to other donors operating within the same policy space. 
Where the World Bank does not step on its own toes in aid activity, the same cannot be said 
when comparing inter-agency aid initiatives and there exists significant overlap and fratricide 
among separate donor organisations and countries. 
 The fourth principle, ‘results’, deals with the lack of sufficient review, monitoring, and 
evaluation processes by donors during and post program implementation. Failing to assess 
results both in the event of program success or failure means that often program design is 
replicated and implemented repeatedly without recognition of why that design produces the 
results that it does. The World Bank has engaged in program review and assessment of results 
for several years prior to the declaration, however, not all programs are reviewed and, as I will 
illustrate in chapter five, even the Independent Evaluation Group rates the World Bank’s 
capacity for monitoring and evaluation as sub-optimal on far too many occasions. In an attempt 
to rectify the lack of normative pressure among donors to measure results, the declaration states 
that both developing countries and donors must make substantial and paradigm-shifting efforts to 
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normalize and implement program review to a far greater degree than what currently exists 
(OECD, n.d.).  
 The final principle of ‘mutual accountability’ again targets both donors and developing 
countries who fail to create productive partnerships in which they hold each other on par as 
accountable partners for program operation and outcome. This principle seems to serve as a 
safeguard in the enforcement of the previous four principles. So developing countries must take 
ownership for their own development strategies and donors must align themselves behind them. 
Harmonisation and measuring results is a way to assess how effectively the first two principles 
are being adhered to and the principle of mutual accountability holds both donors and recipients 
responsible for development outcomes in all aspects of an aid intervention respectively (OECD, 
n.d.).  
The Accra Agenda for Action (2008)  
 The Accra Agenda for Action arose out of HLF-3 in 2008 in Accra and was designed to 
strengthen and further progress made three years earlier in Paris. The agenda is based on four 
themes, closely related to those of the Paris Declaration: ownership, inclusive partnerships, 
delivering results, and capacity development. The OECD describes the agenda as:  
The AAA seeks to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (the Paris Declaration). Prepared through a broad-based process of dialogue 
at both country and international levels, it takes stock of progress on the commitments of 
the Paris Declaration and sets the agenda for accelerating progress to reach the agreed 
targets by 2010 (see accompanying summary of the Paris Declaration) (OECD, n.d.). 
The agenda demonstrated at the very least that just three years after Paris, significant progress 
had been made in shifting development thinking and practice. Even by virtue of the 2008 
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monitoring survey which reviewed the influence that the Paris Declaration had on development 
activity, it was evident that the declaration, non-binding as it was, was more than just lip-service. 
There was an enthusiasm about the Paris principles and an impetus to keep the ball rolling in a 
promising new normative direction.  
 The theme of ‘ownership’ was carried over from the Paris declaration and strengthened in 
lieu of progress reports on implementation of Paris’ principles. The agenda suggested that 
developing countries need to take greater ownership for their development processes through 
greater emphasis on policy formulation, leadership and strengthening of domestic mechanisms of 
aid delivery (OECD, n.d.). The necessity of reiterating and emphasising the role of ownership 
stemmed from findings in the 2008 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration that indicated 
that while progress was being made in promoting developing country ownership, not enough was 
being done (OECD, 2008). The Accra agenda offered more specific guidance on how endorsing 
countries could best honour their commitments to ownership including; broadening development 
policy dialogue within the developing country, strengthening capacity for leadership and 
management in development initiatives, and continuing to strengthen and deepen developing 
country-level systems for program implementation (OECD, n.d.).  
 The second theme of ‘inclusive partnership’ in development was also informed by the 
Paris declaration principles of harmonisation and mutual accountability. The agenda 
recommended that all partners, including donors, developing countries, civil society and other 
multilateral organisations, participate fully in poverty-reduction strategies and development 
initiatives (OECD, n.d.). It was evident in the 2008 survey that while progress had been made in 
harmonising and encouraging mutual accountability between donors and developing country 
partners, it was not enough to the projected targets by 2010 (OECD, 2008). The Accra agenda 
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combined these two principles from Paris and promoted the achievement of inclusive 
partnerships through the following imperatives; reduction of aid fragmentation that proves costly 
to both donors and developing countries, increasing the value of aid given to developing 
countries by removing conditionalities like tied aid, increasing collaboration with other 
development actors operating within the same development policy space, deepening engagement 
with civil society actors, and tailoring aid policies to suit country contexts which may vary in 
degrees of fragility, stability, and capacity (OECD, 2008).  
 The third theme of ‘delivering results’ improves upon the similar Paris principle of 
‘measuring results’. The agenda reiterates the importance of measuring results and adds an 
important re-phrasing so that endorsing development agents are impressed upon to deliver rather 
than simply measure them. This creates additional impetus for all development partners to 
actually conduct program evaluations and analyse results since in an environment where the 
agenda is implemented to its fullest, all partners will rely on each other’s program evaluations 
and assessment of results to proceed with and improve upon further development initiatives 
(OECD, n.d.). According to the 2008 survey, ‘significant’ efforts have been made among 
countries to strengthen monitoring and sector specific information systems, however, few have 
developed mutual review processes by which to hold development partners accountable for 
commitments (OECD, 2008). In response to the survey findings, the Accra agenda advocates the 
following actionable recommendations; focussing on delivering results, increasing accountability 
and transparency of program results for the public and for general knowledge sharing, amending 
the purpose of conditionality in a way that supports ownership, and increasing predictability of 
aid outcomes through focus on the medium-term duree of development strategy and program 
implementation (OECD, 2008).  
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 The fourth more informal theme in the Accra agenda for action is that of ‘capacity 
development’. This agenda item is a culmination of the three previous themes and honours the 
normative spirit of the Paris declaration. The paradigm shift represented by the declaration and 
agenda is one which identifies that development when stripped of subjective normative influence 
is a process of capacity development and promotion within a national or regional policy space 
(OECD, n.d.).  
Criticism 
Despite the promising precedents set in Paris and Accra, academics and policymakers 
alike have offered criticism on areas where both the agenda and declaration fail. Much of the 
criticism revolves around themes of; authorship/ownership, measuring results, and directional 
ambiguity. Many have noted that the development agents who critique the way global funds are 
allocated, managed, and deployed, are the very same who allocate, manage, and deploy those 
funds (Isenman & Shakow, 2010). Additionally, those same agents are also the ones leading the 
reform process at Paris and Accra. Others have pointed to the difficulty in measuring results as a 
consequence of the vague directives of Paris and Accra. It is unclear to signatories and member 
states what success looks like under Paris and Accra and how to achieve and measure it (OECD, 
2014, pp. 30-31). Lastly, the declaration and agenda are critiqued for being too ambiguous in 
their policy recommendations, giving donors and recipients very little direction on how to 
achieve their commitments. Additionally, the OECD lacks the enforcement mechanisms 
necessary to incorporate binding clauses into declarations such as Paris and Accra (Droop, 
Isenman, & Mlalazi, 2008, p. 30). Therefore, as promising as Paris and Accra are, at the end of 
the day, they do not bind member countries to adhere to the principles since no punitive 




With this thesis I address the criticism regarding the directional and policy ambiguity 
featured in key aid effectiveness documents such as Accra and Paris. The lack of clear directives 
and policy recommendations on how best to achieve a responsible, mutually accountable donor-
recipient partnership means that the promise of the normatively novel aid effectiveness agenda 
languishes as member states operate without cohesion or direction-- the policy equivalent of 
stumbling around in poor focus for your reading glasses. I do not seek here to remedy poor 
vision so to speak, I think Paris and Accra do an admirable job in articulating what an ideal 
donor-recipient partnership can look like. Rather, I hope to arm policy experts with a type of lens 
through which problems of aid effectiveness may be analysed with the broader goal of 
contributing to the principles of Paris and Accra. My contribution comes in the form of analytical 
concepts which I propose are crucial in assessing a developing country in anticipation of an aid 
intervention. The concepts are as follows; status quo structuration, non-status quo structuration, 
structural maturation, structural subversion, passive agents, agents with knowledge, and agents 









PART TWO: THE CONTRIBUTION 
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CHAPTER FOUR: STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONS, AGENTS, AND 
STRUCTURATION THEORY 
This chapter introduces some of the conceptual tools I advocate for incorporation into 
World Bank development intervention analysis in order to support the principles of Accra and 
Paris to improve the practice and type of knowledge gleaned from these interventions. The 
concepts are as follows; status quo structuration, non-status quo structuration, structural 
maturation, structural subversion, passive agents, agents with knowledge, and empowered 
agents. In order to do this I borrow conceptually from Giddens’ structuration theory though do 
not adhere to all its tenets as law. As has been demonstrated in the discussion so far, the question 
of who does development, the agents, is a pressing one. In addition to internal and external 
agents of development, I argue in this paper that analysis of recipient state structures and 
institutions is also crucial in assessment and pre-intervention research. This chapter introduces 
structures, agents, institutions and structuration theory, and will analyze their contributions to the 
development enterprise.  
Agents 
Giddens offers a multi-faceted definition of an agent. He claims that the human condition 
is one of agency, human beings act and have purposive weight behind those actions. The 
intentions behind agent behaviour may not be relevant when assessing the impact of an agent’s 
actions. From this, it is inferred that agents have significant potential and that potential is 
manifested through their behaviour and activity, what they choose to do and what they refrain 
from doing and why. However, Giddens goes on to claim that an agent ceases to be an agent if 
he/she loses the capability to ‘make a difference’ or to exercise some degree of power (Giddens, 
1984, pp. 1-34). Accepting Giddens’ position regarding the human condition and agency, it 
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becomes difficult to reconcile this claim with the one he makes later regarding the forfeit of 
agency if a human being loses the capability to ‘make a difference’. It becomes necessary to 
amend Giddens’ conception of the agent, I claim that human beings cannot forfeit their agency 
and offer an alternative conception, one that further dissects the ‘agent’ into three categories: 
passive agents, agents with knowledge, and empowered agents.  
An individual within a state who has no awareness of any development agenda but is 
perhaps unintentionally engaging in state processes may be considered a passive agent. Both 
agents with knowledge and empowered agents on the other hand, have the purposive weight of 
intentionality behind their development contributing behaviour. Thus, development agents are 
knowledgeable drivers of development. An agent with potential is knowledgeable but is 
constrained (perhaps structurally or institutionally) from contributing substantially to 
development. An empowered agent is a knowledgeable agent who has both the potential, 
resources, and means to pursue purposive interaction with a state’s structures and institutions, 
and does. 
An implication of the behaviour of empowered agents is that given the structural or 
institutional constraints agents with potential face, empowered agent are able to operate freely 
within the parameters and permissions of these structural and institutional configurations but 
their actions can collectively alter those parameters and permissions. These parameters and 
permissions dictate the degrees of capacities of agents subject to their constraints. As such, 
empowered agents benefit the most from existing structural and institutional configurations of a 
given state. This means that they benefit from and therefore contribute the most to the structural 
and institutional status quo. This is structuration in action. It is necessary then to question how 
(or whether) empowered agents are actually contributing to development. If we acknowledge 
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that part and parcel of developmental progress is an improvement or re-engineering of structures 
and institutions and subsequently the way these structures and institutions constrain and enable 
agency and action within their jurisdiction, then we must infer that knowledgeable empowered 
agents are engaging in structuration but structuration that is status quo. In other words, 
empowered agents within a state do not so much contribute to development as they do to the 
established degree of development of their state, from which they benefit.  
Structures and their institutions  
Turning to conceptualizations of structures, I again turn to Giddens’ approach for the 
base definition that I work with. Within the framework of his ‘structuration theory’ (elaborated 
upon in the next chapter), ‘…structure is regarded as the rules and resources recursively 
implicated in social reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems have structural 
properties in the sense that relationships are stabilized across time and  ‘space’ (Giddens, 1984, 
p. 25). Giddens goes on explain that ‘structure can be conceptualized as two aspects of rules- 
normative elements and codes of ‘signification’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 29). Despite these very 
detailed parameters for what constitutes a structure, Giddens fails to offer concrete, reliable 
examples of structures in practice. This fluidity in the definition is arguably a benefit to a 
concept as abstract as ‘structure’ and allows for flexibility in the components of the state that a 
researcher might wish to analyze as a type of structure. However this fluidity also limits the 
applicability of the concepts and risks lending itself to conceptual stretching.  
Accepting Giddens’ approach as a base definition for a structure, using inference (and 
taking advantage of Giddens’ conceptual generosity) I posit a number of identifiable state-level 
structures. These structures can be religious, cultural, economic, political, legal, and otherwise 
normative. While sets of religious, cultural, legal, political, economic, and otherwise normative 
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configurations within a society may constitute the more esoteric structural components of the 
state, the institutions that are derived from these structural rules and norms are far more concrete 
and identifiable. Examples of these are: religious institutions such as synagogues and Sikh 
temples, legal institutions such as the Supreme Court, political institutions such as the executive 
branch of government, economic institutions such as banks, or cultural institutions such as ethno-
linguistic clubs.  
Having established the conceptual bases for agents, structures and institution, it is now 
possible to analyze the process by which these core components of any given developed or 
developing state interact. The next chapter introduces structuration theory as a way to 
conceptualize how state structures and institutions are erected, maintained, or adjusted through 
agent interaction.  
Structuration Theory 
Having established the conceptual elements of the approach advocated in this paper 
(agents, structures, institutions), I now turn to their interaction through a survey of Giddens’ 
structuration theory. Structuration theory examines the role of agency in interactions between 
agents and structures. The institutions that I have elected to include in the analytical method 
advocated in this paper are also implicated by this structure-agent interaction. Giddens adopts 
some of Talcott Parson’s previously established assumptions regarding the dualism between 
agents and structures featured in ‘action theory’ (Munch, 1981). This dualism represents the 
indivisibility of agents and structures. According to Giddens, agents and structures are mutually 
constitutive and act upon each other in recursive ways. “According to structuration theory, the 
moment of the production of action is also one of reproduction in the contexts of the day-to-day 
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enactment of social life.” (Giddens, 1984, pp. 1-37) That is to say that agents contribute to the 
qualities of the structure and structures simultaneously inform the behaviour of the agent.  
Passive agents, agents with potential, and empowered agents 
Applying the established conceptualization of types of agents to this process of 
structuration, I propose that different agents possess different degrees of agency in relation to the 
structuration of their societies/states. Passive agents are not knowledgeable in the ways they 
contribute to structuration and do not possess the capacity to influence change within the 
institutions they encounter in their day to day lives and the structures that inform them. 
Therefore, passive agents contribute to the reproduction of the society as it exists, has existed, 
and will continue to exist across time. Most conceptualizations of agents allows for flexibility 
and a range of actions given structural parameters and permissions. This flexibility and choice in 
a particular course of action within the parameters of the structure are generally evident in the 
reasoning an agent employs when justifying his or her actions. While agents may choose similar 
or identical actions given the range available to them, they employ unique rationalizations for 
these actions. This is significant and telling when exploring the degree of agency structures and 
their institutions offer to individuals subject to their parameters. Passive agents in this 
conceptualization of the process of structuration, are the most status quo agents. They are acted 
upon by structural instructions on how to conduct oneself within the context of that specific state 
and do not grate against the parameters of those structures. These passive agents are individuals 
who do not possess (either deliberately or by circumstance) the resources or knowledgeability to 
influence, either through expansion or restriction, the parameters of the structure.  
Contrasting passive agents with agents with potential, the key distinction --the level of 
knowledgeability-- becomes evident. Agents with potential are those individuals within a given 
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society who possess the knowledgeability of their role in structuration, but who lack the 
resources or access to influence structures and institutions. Agents with potential, as is the case 
with passive actors and empowered agents, also engage in status quo behaviour. The difference 
is, that agents with potential may not see benefit of the structural parameters as they exist in the 
form of resources that empowered agents do. As such, agents with potential are critical of 
existing structural configurations of the state and the form that resulting institutions take.  
Empowered agents on the other hand, possessing both knowledge knowledgeability and 
resources, are aware of the full scope of their agency in relation to the structures they are 
recursively linked to. In addition to their knowledgeability, they also possess the resources to 
engage in structuration. As alluded to earlier, the implication of this is, that empowered agents 
are actively engaged in structuration, but in much the same way as passive actors, they are 
operating within the parameters of the structures as they exist. Since their level of capacity is 
also a result of the agent-structural dualism, empowered agents engage in status quo structuration 
as well, being conscious of how it benefits them.  
Structuration and Development  
Applying what I have established about structuration theory, it is now useful to apply this 
to the processes and approaches of development detailed earlier. This framework attempts to 
demonstrate that external development agents are also engaging in similar agent-structure 
interactions as agents within the targeted developing state. At this juncture it is important to 
stress that once external development agents act in the context of the recipient state, their actions 
are also dictated by the structural parameters that are active within that state. They do not 
continue to operate in the context of their own state’s structural context and subsequent 
parameters. I will elaborate on this further below.  
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Conceptually speaking, accepting that the skeleton of any given state involves at its very 
core the interaction of structures and agents, we can infer that some agent-structure interactions 
are ‘productive’ (contributing to development) and that others are ineffective or sub-optimal 
(contributing to developmental stasis or underdevelopment). The structural configuration of 
states is unique and can exist in various stages of productivity depending on the intended 
developmental ‘product’ or outcome. While we can fairly safely take patriarchy as a given 
structural component of any state, the other structural components and the institutions that are 
derived from it can vary considerably. 
An example of a state’s structural configuration can be as follows. States like Pakistan 
feature the political precedence of the military as a component to governance, the structural 
weight of the prominent religion, Sunni Islam, and its influence on healthcare and educational 
institutions. Pakistan also features economic structures that reflect neo-liberal norms from the 
West such as relatively free markets and compliance with the rules and regulations of many 
international trade agreements of which they are members. We see a democratic regime type that 
features hybrid civilian/military rule. We see ethnic hierarchies at the structural level of the state 
in which institutions derived from this configuration work to benefit and favour certain 
ethnicities over others. Cultural structures also manifest in the type of cultural products Pakistan 
produces (TV dramas, music, prayer mats). Underpinning all of these structural components is 
the omnipresent structure of patriarchy which underscores other structural and institutional 
components of the state and often compounds their effects.  
When multilateral institutions that engage in development like the IMF and the World 
Bank categorize states as either developing or developed, it is the products of these structural 
configurations on which they base their conclusions. Normative conclusions on the day to day 
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effects that structures have on the lives of the people and the degree of sustainability through 
economic activity a state can maintain, are the basis by which the world is divided into 
developed and developing. These normatively-laden assumptions on what constitutes a 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ state are generated in the developed world. Based on these 
normative assumptions, the developed world features productive structural configurations. The 
way the component structures of developed states act and interact and the way the institutions 
that are derived from these structures are layered, are perceived to be conducive to the normative 
ideal of a developed state.  
Developing states that are identified for developmental interventions either through 
invitation from the developing state’s government or through externally-lead initiatives, are 
therefore targeted for what is conceptually speaking, structural tailoring or amendment. The 
structures of the recipient state are the source of any institutional or otherwise 
observable/measurable realities of a given state. After all, following structuration theory, a state 
would not be developed or developing unless its structural and institutional configuration 
allowed it to be. For example, if a targeted developing state is identified as having high rates of 
infant and maternal mortality, the quality of healthcare institutions is most obviously implicated. 
However, the suitability and functionality of the economic system and its ability to allocate 
revenue effectively to crucial sectors is also implicated. The institutional capacity of the political 
administration is also implicated, are they failing in tax revenue collection or is endemic 
corruption siphoning off taxpayer dollars for individual benefit rather than the societal good? Are 
specific religious institutions disseminating ideas that promote the use of more traditional 
healthcare methods? Is the patriarchal structure that underscores many of the other structures and 
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subsequent institutions preventing a prioritization of maternal health? The answers to these 
questions are crucial for generating holistic, organic, and concrete developmental progress.  
External agents and structuration  
Given that within the context of a state, agents with varying degrees of potential, 
capacity, and passivity engage in structuration and replication of the structural configuration of 
the state as it exists. When external development agents act within a developing context, they too 
possess agency only as far as the structural parameters of that state allow. They are constrained 
in the same way agents of the state are. Unless the external development agent is willfully 
violating recipient state laws, they do, as empowered agents that is possible through recipient 
state sanction, contribute to the structural status quo from which they benefit. This is not to 
suggest that the development agent is simply ‘playing the game’ which allows them employment 
and the chance to travel, or that they have malicious intent in which they want the developing 
state to remain in a degree of underdevelopment. Rather, I argue here that this glaring fallacy in 
contemporary donor-driven development work is simply ignored.  
Structuration in action 
There are significant ways that the contemporary tools of development that are most 
commonly employed in externally-directed developing state interventions are implicated in 
replication of recipient state structures and institutions. While Giddens does not offer specific 
instructions on how best to research and demonstrate processes of structuration, he does give a 
broad directional recommendation:  
‘analysing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such systems 
grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in 
62 
the diversity of action contexts, are produced and reproduced in  ‘interaction’ (Giddens, 1984, p. 
25). 
Using this broad prescription, I will demonstrate the ways in which different development policy 
tools and agents contribute to agent-structure interactions.  
Loans and structuration 
Keeping these micro-level interactions by which agents engage with structures and their 
institutions in mind, it is possible to apply the same logic demonstrated above to analyze the 
contributions of dominant development policy tools to the structural configuration of recipient 
states. Turning first to the use of loans for the purposes of filling a deficiency in the capital 
necessary to jump-start self-sufficient development, a number of problematic processes become 
evident.  
As has already been established, loans are offered to the administrative units of 
developing states by a number of donor-types including: multilateral organisations like the IMF, 
bilateral partners, NPOs and NGOs. Millions of dollars flow to the developing world through the 
disbursement of these loans. Loans are in theory, conditional on repayment. Donors can refuse 
disbursement of subsequent tranches of loans if the recipient state has not made efforts to repay 
what has already been issued. A recipient state’s history of repayment of loans can also 
negatively affect its international standing as a ‘good investment’ for foreign direct investment 
and other loans. In practice, loans have for decades been issued in overwhelming contravention 
to these good-practices of lending. Many recipient states continue to receive huge amounts of 
loans from donors for either geo-strategic purposes or because they have been identified as 
‘special projects’ for development agencies (Frot, Olofsgard, & Berlin, 2013). The fact that 
many recipient states that fail to generate some minimal degree of self-sufficiency continue to 
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receive loans becomes hugely problematic when loans repayment deadlines loom and interest 
begins to accumulate on these loans. If the recipient state is unable to repay the base amount of 
the loan, it stands to reason they will be doubly unable to repay the huge amounts of interest that 
accumulate (Bjornskov & Schroder, 2013).  
Loans are exposed as deeply problematic in the event that the recipient state features a 
non-productive status quo. I argue that loans first and foremost reinforce the status quo through 
the contribution of vast amounts of resources by which agents within the recipient state’s context 
may engage in structuration. As has been demonstrated, a state that is identified as a prospective 
recipient for loans is identified on the basis of its sub-optimal structural configuration. While this 
is not overt or often even apparent to donors, these structural configurations exist and are 
maintained through capital and other resources. These structural configurations may be not be 
productive in contributing to developmental outcomes but they do benefit certain agents within 
the recipient state. These agents who stand to benefit are empowered agents who are engaging in 
status quo agent-structure interaction. Empowered agents are often (but not always) optimally-
positioned within society in ways where they may maintain the status quo. This often means they 
are part of the administrative apparatus of the state, the same administrative apparatus that is on 
the receiving end of development loans. Loans make their way to the hands of empowered 
agents, who can use this capital to reinforce and strengthen the institutional manifestations of the 
structural status quo. Therefore, once capital is introduced into the structural context of the 
recipient state, it often operates counter-productively to the development goal the loan was 
intended to contribute to.  
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How programs contribute to or subvert the status quo 
Externally directed development programs are used frequently by multilateral institutions 
like the World Bank and can be either formulaic or context-specific. They can be national 
initiatives, sector specific, or local. What relationship do these programs, their goals, and their 
methods have with the established institutional and structural status quo? Having established that 
loans are conceptually problematic when viewed from the perspective of structuration theory, 
programs are by this same measure less so. While programmatic interventions certainly feature 
capital resources for administrative and implementation purposes, the thrust of their contribution 
comes from the expertise, personnel, organization, and substance of the program.  
In terms of interaction with recipient state structural configuration, programs may either 
reinforce the status quo, occupy a space within the structural parameters of the state that is not 
status quo, or fail. Many externally-directed development programs attempt to introduce either 
incubators for crucial components of development which do not already exist in that state or aim 
to nurture promising developments that are in their fledgling (and therefore most vulnerable) 
period. Externally directed development initiatives are often informed by lessons gleaned from 
either the developed world or lessons gleaned from development initiatives in other parts of the 
world (Coelho & Goldemberg, 2013). The expertise used to inform the programs is therefore 
often ‘foreign’. Thus, these programs may lack recipient state specific information to inform the 
formulation of their programs. Additionally, experts and administrators of these programs are 
often external development agents. While domestic partnerships certainly exist and at times may 
even be domestically directed, they are often conceptualized in isolation from recipient state 
structural considerations.  
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In practice, we see that a development agency may decide to implement a program in a 
specific state. In their assessments of what may be a useful program for the recipient state, 
questions often revolve around what the recipient state is missing. So for example, if the 
recipient state has poor educational infrastructure, the development agency may seek to 
supplement what is lacking and arrive at the program prescription of training primary school 
teachers. This logic avoids any consideration of the structural parameters of the recipient state. 
Instead of being content with asking ‘what is the state lacking?’ development practitioners must 
push their pre-program analysis further. The more pertinent and telling question when 
accounting for unique structural configurations is ‘Why is the state lacking in this issue area?’ 
This question will, when explored to its fullest, reveal structural explanations for varying degrees 
of development. This shift in thinking I am advocating in this paper has already begun and is best 
exemplified by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action. However, I argue here that 
while the Declaration and Agenda paint a rosy and promising picture in theory, applying the 
principles is more difficult in the context of minimal or negligible enforcement mechanisms 
between donors and recipients. Why does Pakistan have such low rates of rural literacy? Using 
what has been established about agents, structures, and structuration, I highlight three of many 
possibilities.  
First, Pakistani social structures and their institutions limit the ability of agents to 
promote rural education. What does this mean specifically? According to the conceptualization 
of structuration theory advocated here, the structures that exist in Pakistan and the institutions 
that arise from them are configured in a way that is pre-disposed to produce certain development 
outcomes and inhibit others. In this case, Pakistan’s religious structure produces a variety of 
religious institutions. Among these varieties, the most dogmatic have taken root in rural areas. 
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Despite Pakistan officially being a secular state, these rural religious institutions promote 
religious education over secular curricula. Additionally, rural religious institutions may have 
manifested in a particularly dogmatic way because Pakistan’s economic institutions are 
inefficient at allocating the benefits of economic growth to the rural areas. This lack of resources 
in rural areas may contribute to higher rates of poverty, malnutrition, scarce or poor health 
services, and therefore higher rates of mortality among adults and children. It can be inferred that 
having to contend with higher probabilities of the death of loved ones, Pakistanis in rural areas 
may seek solace in their religious institutions. These religious institutions may have responded to 
this need and manifested in such a way that focuses on the hereafter as a means of consolation 
and prescriptions for how to attain it and therefore worldly achievements like secular education 
are deemed insignificant. This may contribute to lower demand among rural populations for 
secular education, local leaders may feel no pressure to push the agenda and thus rural agents 
engage in status quo structuration. The result is a lack of rural pressure for leaders to prioritize 
secular education.  
This partly informs the second possibility, that structural parameters do allow for 
improvements in rural education but these routes have not been explored due to status quo agent-
structure interaction and the fact that knowledgeable agents who may understand the processes 
by which rural education may be improved upon do not have the capacity to engage in more 
productive interactions. Low rates of rural education can be identified by local affected agents as 
a problem, but it may be a scenario where the agents with potential who are best situated within 
the agent structure dualism to critically reflect on the processes of status quo agent-structure 
interactions they witness, lack the resources to affect the opinions of local leadership. They may 
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be members of an ethno-religious minority, or women, or children. In a patriarchal society, these 
intersectional markers are as effective at stifling dissent as a physical gag. 
A significant implication of the fact that agents with potential are the best suited to reflect 
critically on sub-optimal structural configurations, is of course that that critical engagement is 
sanctioned within the parameters of those very configurations. This creates promising prospects 
for harnessing agents with potential for sustained and productive development outcomes. This 
also suggests that there exists a wide variety of institutional and developmental potentials for 
structural configurations and the parameters they set and they need only be operationalized.  
This leads to the third possibility, that the structural configuration as it exists today may 
not be conducive to development in rural educational, but that the trajectory of this configuration 
may in the future be conducive to sustained improvements in rural education. Applied to the 
example of rural education, this can mean that the decentralized mode of government in rural 
Pakistan may be a relatively new installation and local leadership is still in the establishing phase 
of its administration. This can mean that at present, local leadership is relying on dominant 
ethno-religious affiliations in the area to decide agenda items and to allocate funding. However, 
in the long-run, if a rural municipality is beginning to decay and central authority begins to apply 
pressure to local leadership, these leaders may then be influenced to respond to local dissent in a 
more conciliatory manner. This may create openings for agents with potential to use their critical 
knowledge of local processes through the resources of more willing local leadership. And while 
there are certainly prospects for backsliding and reneging on commitments, there are also 
prospects that that specific instance of non-status quo agent-structure interactions may have set 
too powerful a precedent to renege on.  
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How grants contribute to or subvert the status quo 
A last external development policy tool that is gaining in popularity is that of grants. 
Grants are disbursements of capital that are issued without the condition of repayment. For 
conceptual clarity, I include loans that are forgiven by donors to recipients who are severely 
incapacitated as conceptually equivalent to a grant since the outcome is the same. Grants and 
forgiven loans represent an injection of capital that is not accompanied with the complementary 
and compounding burden of repayment.  
Building on what has already been established about the contribution loans make to 
structuration, much of the same logic also extends to grants insofar as they also represent an 
injection of capital is used in the domestic structural context by empowered agents to engage in 
status quo structuration. Using this conceptualization, the appeal of grants for many development 
practitioners and recipient governments that are earnest in their desire to improve their state’s 
developmental prospects, is lessened. If the similarity between loans and grants in their 
immediate contribution to the recipient state result in similar conclusions about their contribution 
to status quo agent-structure interaction, it may be useful to analyze the issue on the basis of the 
dissimilarities.  
Repayment and Structuration  
How does the issue of repayment contribute to status quo agent-structure interactions in 
the developing state, if at all? Considering the necessary condition of repayment that 
accompanies loans, we can draw significant conclusions on the contribution of repayment to the 
structural status quo. Revisiting what I have already established regarding the role of monetary 
resources in structuration, I argue that repayment actually creates the potential for non-status quo 
paths of structural engagement. If loan monies fall into the well-worked institutional and 
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structural grooves by which the status quo is perpetuated, then mechanisms by which monetary 
resources are removed for the purposes debt-servicing from this process weakens that status quo. 
This stripping away of structural and institutional reinforcements opens up the possibility for 
new avenues and iterations of non-productive status quos. I argue that recipient state 
governments that are burdened with repayment must make difficult choices regarding where the 
money for repayment will come from. This can mean one of two things: that recipient state 
governments either make myopic cutbacks in sectors that affect marginalised groups who do not 
have the resources or the knowledgeability to challenge the status quo, or, that recipient states 
governments can harness the burden of repayment to generate new (non-status quo), more 
productive policies and institutional arrangements. In this sense, the burden of repayment 
actually contributes more to growth and development than the loan itself. The difference is that 
the loan capital itself benefits and reinforces the structural status quo but does not effectively 
create sufficient pressure for structural/institutional revision. The burden of repayment however, 
acts as a penalty or negative reinforcement of the status quo which must be mitigated through 
institutional adjustments. The result is that the loan that is offered to the recipient state benefits 
the status quo while the process of repayment implicitly challenges it. Grants, as has already 
been established are not only more conducive to problematic status quo structuration, but are 
also not accompanied with a ‘stick’ component to the carrot that might compel the recipient state 
government to at the very least consider non-status quo options when faced with the prospect of 
repayment.  
Implications 
The implications of what I am arguing are as follows: development is a complex hybrid 
of objective aims and subjective manifestations and that development is fluid. Each state can 
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exist with a variety of alternative structural configurations. The key lies in finding the one most 
conducive to development and promoting it. The bigger issue is understanding and allowing for 
the prospect that development can look a lot of different ways. These diverse manifestations of 
what a developed state can look like, may not be familiar conceptions of development or 
progress and may even appear contradictory to Western manifestations. The measure of 
successful development is, at its most reductive, at least as far as external interventions and 
agents are concerned, about generating the capacity for self-sufficiency. The dissection of agency 
featured in this thesis reveals the importance of selecting the correct candidates for 
implementation of an aid program. This also demonstrates some of the different mechanisms by 
which agents and institutions interact, the nature of the interaction is reflected in the outcome. 
The next sections illustrate and expand upon the types of agent-structure interactions in order to 
further reveal the micro-mechanisms by which a state is produced and reproduced in a given 
form.  
Structural Maturation 
If the intention of the development intervention is one of structural maturation, where the 
developing state in question is identified as being in a state of underdevelopment due to the fact 
that the structural components of the state and the institutions are perhaps new or constrained in 
their maturation through a lack of resources, then formalized, status quo channels for the 
intervention are appropriate. This can be suitable when the recipient state features strong 
structural foundations but the institutions may be weak or constrained. Leadership in these states 
is most likely supportive of interventions when taking development outcomes into account and 
leaders are generally on board with development interventions provided they are sensitive to 
local contexts and sufficient jurisdictional deference to state authority is provided.  
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In these scenarios, loans may be appropriate policy tools through which structural 
maturation is achieved. Loans in this scenario are best issued to recipient state governments that 
will possess greater knowledge of where best to allocate ‘water’ based on where it is most 
needed within the ‘tree’. In this case, status quo agent-structure interactions are productive and 
necessary and empowered agents and their propensity for the status quo is a positive. However, 
if it is recognized that a lack of resources in achieving structural maturation is the main 
impediment for development, grants may be more effective a policy tool. Since grants are not 
paired with the requisite burden of repayment, they may be the most efficient at achieving the 
development outcome.  
Structural Subversion  
If the aim of the development intervention is to circumvent the institutional constraints of 
the state, it is best to harness the seeds of potential and create a permissive environment for them 
to flourish within the resource radius of the target tree. Development practitioners may need to 
circumvent the structural/institutional configuration of the recipient state in instances where it is 
identified as being fully matured, unproductive, or in a state of decay. This can be identified in 
instances where the formal structural channels are recognised as being a part of the problem. A 
developing state in this case may be rife with corruption and nepotism in key institutions. 
Leadership can be unelected, unconcerned with the health of the state or its people (or actively 
oppressive to them), or focussed solely on amassing personal wealth.  
In these scenarios it is most conducive to developmental outcomes to avoid the formal 
channels for development when possible (without of course breaking the law). This type of 
intervention would be a more delicate process requiring agent and development tool sensitivity. 
If the need for structural subversion and institutions is recognized, the seeds of potential 
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alternative configurations of structures and institutions must be planted. They must be planted 
however, by domestic agents. This is crucial, any developmental progress must be authored by 
domestic agents so that it is sustainable without constant intervention by external agents. The 
right domestic agents will also inherently possess greater knowledge of domestic 
structural/institutional permissions and constraints and potential for change.  
As has already been established, empowered agents will necessarily be status quo and are 
likely to operate in key positions within the state/society that allow them to maintain the 
structural status quo. Passive agents will also be status quo through the lack of resources and 
knowledge regarding the processes of structuration. Agents with potential are the ones who are 
best equipped to erect subvert existing structures. An excellent example of structural subversion 
lies in the prevalence of large informal sectors in many developing states such as the popularity 
and proven success of microfinance programs in the developing world. These two examples 
feature agents with potential identifying harmful constraints within their structural/institutional 
realities and working actively to circumvent them.  
External development practitioners must target agents with potential if it is identified that 
the status quo is non-productive. As has been established grants are the most conducive policy 
tools to status quo agent-structure interaction. However, another caveat must be added here to 
reign in my damning treatment of grants as an ineffective policy tool. If the grants are being 
issued through formal channels and therefore necessarily interacting with institutions and 
subsequently reinforcing structures, grants are the most detrimental and counter-productive 
policy tool. If development practitioners are targeting agents rather than institutions however, 
grants gain a significant degree of utility. In this conception, empowering an agent with potential 
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to engage in productive non-status quo agent-structure interaction can be realized in a number of 
ways.  
Development practitioners can offer funding for microfinance programs through grants 
that do not require repayment. Microfinance programs are conceptually different than 
development programs that facilitate the building of schools or hospitals. This is due to the fact 
that microfinance programs are not normatively laden. They provide the universal currency for 
agent-structure interaction, money. What beneficiaries of this program do with the money is not 
dictated by the program. This freedom allows agents with potential to act upon their 
knowledgeability to create non-status quo channels of productive institutional configurations or 
to subvert existing institutions to fill in gaps where the status quo configuration fails.  
Another route for subverting structures can come from something as small-scale as 
offering agents with potential the funding for business ventures. This can only succeed when the 
donor does not place conditions on the funding, agents must be able to actualize the benefit of 
the funding in whichever way they deem fit. This can mean something as small-scale as donors 
providing the capital for an agent to develop their own clothing store. This clothing store if 
successful can provide clothing for the community at costs lower than they might get at other 
established multi-national clothing stores. It can provide a source of employment for the 
community and can allow employees and owners the financial means by which they can educate 
their children. The success of the store can dictate whether the owner of the business engages in 
community building programs. The business may expand to provide even greater means of 
employment and community enrichment. The business may also decide instead of importing 
clothing or purchasing pre-made garment wholesale, to venture into weaving. This can create 
expertise in the community and be a source of knowledge dissemination.  
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This is organic, local, micro-scale development at its best and most effective. These 
recommendations do not preclude the possibility that many of these ventures may fail or the 
grants and loans that are issued by donors may be productive, they may make their way back to 
formal channels and contribute to the structuration of a detrimental status quo. It is argued here 
however, that the possibilities for success are much more promising than they are through 
offering large-scale loans to developing state governments or to agents who contribute to a non-
productive status-quo. The amount of development interventions that are funded and which fail 






CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDIES 
Given what has been established thus far regarding the types of considerations that must 
be taken into account when developing programs for recipient states, it is possible to create a 
guiding framework for analysis of development interventions, both pre- and post-program.  
In this chapter, I present a number of pertinent questions that must be addressed by 
development practitioners both pre- and post-program intervention.  
I endorse the following analytical questions for consideration by World Bank program 
development agencies prior to the planned intervention. These questions are informed by 
principles which inform the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action: 
What is the development problem being addressed? 
Why is this a development problem? 
What cross-sectoral or state-wide structural influences act upon the identified 
development problem? I.e. how does the economic model/system affect a problem 
identified in the health sector? 
Interview those affected by the problem, what do they identify as causation or 
correlation for the problem? (this would require community-wide, sector-wide, or 
national-level surveys depending on the issue) 
Interview those on the administrative end, what do they identify as causation or 
correlation for the issue? (this would require community-wide, sectoral-wide, or 
national-level surveys depending on the issue) 
Analyze results to determine causality 
Identify whether you are attempting: 
a. Structural maturation (promoting the status quo or circumventing it) or 
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b. Structural subversion 
Identify agents accordingly  
Design the development intervention accordingly 
For post-intervention evaluation, analyses must continue to assess failures/success/ and 
externalities. However, following the logic of structuration theory, successes need only be 
analyzed for the purposes of increasing country-specific knowledge—development successes 
must not be replicated in different contexts. Failures must be analyzed in as similar manner to the 
pre-intervention analyses advocated above. I endorse the following questions for adoption by the 
World Bank program evaluation agencies (to report back to program development agencies) after 
the development intervention has been implemented. These questions are again informed by the 
Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action but my contribution lies in the introduction of 
the analytical concepts by which I propose the World Bank answer these questions: 
1. Attempt to answer why the program failed or succeeded through systemic 
thinking 
Based on structurally informed development goals, were the goals achieved? 
a. Did the project succeed or fail in facilitating or promoting structural 
maturation (status quo or non-status quo)? 
b. Did the project succeed or fail in facilitating or promoting structural 
subversion? 
c. In the event of intervention failure: was the data misinterpreted? Were the 
wrong agents targeted?  
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Conduct surveys of those affected and those implementing the program to determine 
causation and gain greater information regarding the conditions around failure or 
success. 
These analytical tools of inquiry are not presented here as the only relevant analyses for 
development interventions, rather they are promoted as crucial components to any pre- and post- 
intervention analysis. The focus on systemic thinking will improve the degree of 
knowledgeability for development practitioners and will limit instances in which interventions 
fail, produce unexpected negative externalities, or exacerbate the development context in which 
they are operating. A key take-away of this analysis focuses on allowing those subject to (or 
affected by) the development intervention to create the narrative. This will necessitate a re-
alignment of elite technocratic intuition, namely that experts only exist on the basis of 
knowledgeability of: economics, project management, or policy development, etc. I argue that 
those subject to the conditions of underdevelopment may be equally or more qualified to 
comment on or contribute to solutions. This must be acknowledged in a greater capacity than it 
currently is among development practitioners, that is, mainly through lip-service and must be 
operationalized.  
Another key takeaway is that the ‘order of operations’ of development interventions is 
important and subjective! This is not to imply that there is a concrete order of operations that all 
states must follow in order to develop. Rather, I argue that there is a subjective, state-specific, 
order of development milestones that build upon the foundational capacity for sustained 
development and which prime the recipient state for successful programmatic interventions. 
Attention must be paid to these foundational prerequisites for development, if practitioners aim 
to increase chances of success. This foundation can be unique and must be established if the 
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development enterprise and its interventions are to gain any degree of reliability and efficacy in 
the work they claim to specialize in. 
In order to demonstrate that this type of systemic thinking is not being incorporated into 
current World Bank operations, I present below six geographically diverse case studies. These 
case studies feature reviews of programmatic interventions in the recipient state and are 
conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) within the jurisdiction of the World 
Bank. These cases have been selected relatively randomly, some consideration was given to 
ensure geographical and programmatic diversity. I analyze these case studies through the 
analytical framework presented above. The case studies are: the health system modernization 
project in Albania, the health workforce and services project in Indonesia, the higher education 
development project in Jordan, the HIV/AIDs capacity building and technical assistance program 
in Lesotho, and the second social action fund in Tanzania. 
Health System Modernization Project—Albania, 2006-2012  
The Health System Modernization Project (HSMP) was directed by the World Bank and 
supported by an International Development Aid (IDA) credit of 10.7 (US $15.4) million in 
special drawing rights (SDR). The project was implemented in the context of a severely 
overburdened, inefficient, and fragmented health system. Program objectives were focused on: 
improving access to high quality primary health care services, improving government capacity to 
formulate policies and reforms in the health sector, and to improve hospital governance and 
management (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 11). The program also prioritized 
improving poor and under-serviced areas and weeding out inefficient use of hospitals. The 
project’s outcome is rated moderately unsatisfactory, the objectives of the project were deemed 
highly relevant to national health priorities, the relevance of the design of the project to these 
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objectives was rated modest, the risk posed to the objectives of the project were rated significant, 
overall bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory, overall borrower performance is rated 
moderately unsatisfactory, implementing agency performance was rated moderately satisfactory, 
and monitoring and evaluation was rated modest (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, pp. xii-
xiv). 
Structural Analysis of the HSMP (based on information gathered by the WB for the 
program) 
The development problem being addressed by the HSMP is not explicitly stated in the 
performance review conducted by the IEG. Based on the information provided as well the 
parameters and features of the program detailed, an initial problem is inferred here. The 
development problem the HSMP attempts to contend with is that of an overburdened, inefficient, 
and fragmented health care system. These failings in Albania’s health care system are amplified 
when considering the experiences of marginalized groups (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, 
p. 5).  
This is identified as a development problem on the basis of near-universal recognition 
that the health of a society is crucial for its development (Taylor & Hall, 1967). Key health 
challenges identified in the report include: a growing incidence of non-communicable diseases, 
the affordability of health care for low-income groups, and a health-sector ill-equipped to deal 
with the burden of new health risks (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 5).  
Cross-sectoral and structural influences that act upon the identified development problem 
can be determined throughout the report by analyzing the explanations offered for component or 
entire program outcomes. The report identifies several barriers to implementation including; 
political strife related to the 2009 elections (half way through the period of program 
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implementation), significant turnover of health ministry staff, and ambiguous delineation of roles 
and responsibilities in geographical jurisdictions and levels of bureaucracy (Independent 
Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 14). Additionally, the appointment of staff to the ministry of health is 
identified as being based on political favours and exhibitive of cronyism within Albania’s 
political system. This replacement of qualified ministry of health staff with politically appointed 
staff has led to significant loss of institutional memory, expertise, and a drop in quality of 
services being provided (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 35). The chaotic election 
campaign and the disorderly transition of power featured in the 2009 Albanian elections also 
indicates structural and institutional weaknesses in the Albanian political system.  
The report identifies the lack of clear delineation of roles and responsibilities as a 
contributing factor to the program’s sub-optimal outcome. This lack of delineation is attributed 
to the decentralized environment in which the health sector operated at the time of project 
implementation (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 14). From this, one can conclude that 
the decentralized system may not have had the chance to fully mature before the project was 
implemented. One could also conclude however that the dysfunctionality of the program under 
the decentralized system speaks to the inappropriateness or unfeasibility of the decentralized 
system in the Albanian context.  
One way to probe the issue further to gain greater conclusiveness on one claim over the 
other is to investigate the features of the decentralized system itself. This can be conducted 
through interviews and subsequent analysis of the first hand experiences of the people subject to 
the decentralized system. Another way to probe the issue further is to re-visit the policies and 
legislation surrounding the process of decentralization, investigating both whether the legislation 
warrants review and whether the agents of decentralization within the state are adhering and 
81 
engaging in structuration within the parameters of those parameters and laws. From this 
development practitioners and government officials can determine whether the failings of the 
decentralized system are beyond repair or whether the issue lies in the way agents are behaving 
within the structural parameters dictated, I.e. in a non-status quo way when status quo behavior is 
warranted.  
Additionally, the performance review points repeatedly to the lack of quality in the 
products being offered by the health sector. The program incorporates a financing scheme that 
would allow low-income groups in Albania to pay for health services at a more forgiving pace. 
Despite this however, due to the fact that the Albanian health care system does not yet feature a 
‘culture’ of quality services, many marginalized groups who do seek healthcare solutions feel 
compelled to offer bribes out of pocket in an attempt to guarantee better service for themselves 
and their loved ones (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014, p. 28). This introduces yet another 
institutional malady into the equation, that of corruption. The fact that even when offered other 
avenues for payment which would be more forgiving to patients and their families, 
institutionalized usage of bribery still persists is indicative of broader structural failings in the 
political, social and economic system. The fact that those on the receiving end of the bribes 
continue to accept them is a major contributing factor for the persistence of that form of 
corruption within the Albanian health care system. The fact that it is socially recognized that a 
bribe will presumably guarantee better service is indicative of the socialized normalization of the 
use of bribery in day to day life. Lastly, paying bribes affects every Albanian financially. Upper 
or middle class families must incorporate the normalized necessity of bribes into their budgeting 
and lower class families are even more significantly affected since the financial impact of paying 
bribes will be much greater relatively speaking on them and may affect their ability to maintain 
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even subsistence living. On the other hand, those receiving bribes may do so predominantly for 
financial gain but this again implicates questions of agency. Are the agents in society who 
receive bribes doing so as passive agents who uncritically follow the predetermined societal 
status quo, because ‘it is just the way things are done in Albania’? Or, are they receiving bribes 
to supplement income that is not being sufficiently provided by national wage rates for their 
professions? Is the social welfare system weak or nonexistent and therefore provides impetus for 
agents within the society to accept bribes in the event that they may need the extra income in 
cases of emergencies? Lastly, are the agents who receive bribes positioned in society in a manner 
where they have the capacity to be on the receiving end of bribes and therefore invested in the 
maintenance of that status quo? All of these factors are relevant and equally crucial in the 
resolution of core, systemic issues in the event that something like corruption and a ‘culture of 
bribery’ is identified as an impeding factor in the success of a development intervention like the 
HSMP.  
To summarize, some of the structural and systemic issues identified as impediments to 
the success of the program are: corruption, cronyism, societal normalization of bribery, 
inefficiencies in the economic system, political instability, the lack of a culture of quality within 
the health care system, and a dysfunctional decentralized system (Independent Evaluation Group, 
2014). Analyzing the implicated structural and institutional features of Albania, it is possible to 
infer that given the fact that many of the impediments to program success are couched in the 
formal administrative end, that the structural status quo that represents is problematic. However, 
this inference coupled with the fact that many of the formal, administrative elements that are 
identified as problematic are also identified in terms that suggest they are ‘immature’, we can 
also conclude that status quo maturation may be appropriate in this case. This means that the 
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formal administrative channels for development and the agents may be harnessed for 
development through the provision of resources and technical capacity. However, given the 
Albanian condition of cronyism, this means that alternative agents may need to be identified for 
implementation of the program that are not part of the administrative status quo.  
Health Workforce and Services Project—Indonesia, 2003-2008 
The Health Workforce and Services Project (HWS) was conceived and developed by the 
World Bank and supported with an IDA of $54.78 million. The objectives of the project were: 
piloting effective health sector decentralization in selected provinces, supporting the ministry of 
health in a new oversight role in a decentralized health system, and to support effective health 
workforce policy and management (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. xiii). The project’s 
outcome is rated unsatisfactory, the objectives of the project were deemed highly relevant, the 
relevance of the design of the project to these objectives was rated modest, the risk posed to the 
objectives of the project were rated significant, overall bank performance is rated unsatisfactory, 
overall borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory, implementing agency performance was 
rated unsatisfactory, and monitoring and evaluation was rated negligible (Independent 
Evaluation Group, 2013, p. xiv). The report makes explicit the fact that this project was 
implemented in the context of a recently decentralized Indonesian Health care system (1999, four 
years before project implementation) (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. xiii).  
Structural analysis of HWS 
Again, the project review does not explicitly state a development problem that is being 
tackled. The general development objective is ‘to support health sector decentralization in four 
provinces for sustainable financing and client-centered delivery of health services’ (Independent 
Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 37). The specific objective was to 
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assist the borrower in achieving the effective delivery of health services in Indonesia in a 
decentralized setting by strengthening (i) the financing and delivery of health services in 
the borrower’s provinces of Jambi, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan and West 
Sumatra, so as to enhance the quality of care and health outcomes at the District Level; 
and (ii) health workforce policy, management and development at the national and sub-
national levels so as to improve allocative efficiencies and equity in the distribution and 
use of health  ‘resources’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 37).  
In addition, the project aimed to empower the Ministry of Health (MoH) and to assist in the clear 
delineation and definition of jurisdictional roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders and 
sectors as well as to generally improve policymaking mechanisms, and technical and institutional 
capacity within the different provinces and districts (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 
38).  
The project focus on assisting Indonesian health ministry officials stemmed from the 
relatively recent implementation of the decentralization program, the aim being to build capacity 
among MoH agents. Since decentralization was introduced to the Indonesian health sector 
relatively recently, the risk to the effectiveness of health service provision was identified as 
being elevated (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 48).  
A number of cross-sectoral and structural influence can be identified as intervening 
variables in the effectiveness of the project. Ambiguous and poorly defined roles and 
responsibilities were identified in the report as a significant challenge for successful project 
implementation. Program developers assumed that the roles and responsibilities that they would 
need to secure successful implementation already existed in the context of a decentralized 
Indonesia. This proved untrue and lead to opacity in tracing the transfer of funds between 
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ministries, districts and jurisdictions. The districts were identified in the report as having limited 
control over the financial resources allocated to them and therefore inefficiencies were bred into 
the flow and process of disbursement of funds (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 14). In 
addition, WB program developers assumed that Indonesia’s central governmental authority was 
in support of the ministry of health’s newly decentralized system, which also proved to be an 
untenable assumption. This lack of support for the program from central authority explains some 
of the transparency and opacity in tracing the funds for the program.  
The tension between the interests of the central authority with the districts and ministry of 
health can be identified as a cross-sectoral impediment to implementation. Studies have shown 
that Indonesia’s decentralized health system does not clearly delineate responsibilities between 
central government and districts (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, pp. 2-4). The roles of 
district-levels versus those of ministry of health officials tends to incorporate redundancies in 
jurisdiction and process, breeding inefficiencies into the system. Alternately, gaps are identified 
in other areas where there is no oversight for some processes being conducted at the district-level 
(Lieberman, Capuno, & Minh, 2005, p. 59). This suggests a degree of political disjunction at the 
administrative level. The influence of political disjunction in the success of the development 
intervention is quite apparent in this example.  
The decentralisation of Indonesia’s health care system was initiated in the context of a 
‘reform era’ in Indonesia. The sparks of political optimism that pervaded Indonesian society after 
President Suharto resigned his post were at their most vibrant in 1999, immediately after the 
succession. Health sector decentralization was initiated under the presidency of Abdurrahman 
Wahid and his National Unity Cabinet (USA International Business Publications, 2008, p. 25). 
However, the HWS program was implemented in 2003, during the reign of his successor 
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President Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) from 2001-2004. 
Sukarnoputri was widely recognized as a symbol rather than an authoritative leader and most day 
to day government decisions and activities were directed by the Mutual Assistance Cabinet. 
Corruption was pervasive during this time (Mydans, 2001). The 2004 Indonesian elections 
ushered in the reign of yet another leader, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the 
Democratic Party of Indonesia (Ananta, Arifin, & Suryadinata, 2005, p. 89). It was under 
Yudhoyono that the majority and remainder of the HWS was implemented. A point worth 
mentioning here is that during Yudhoyono’s reign, Indonesia suffered a slew of natural disasters 
including the 2004 Indian earthquake, the Tsunami at Nias Island, the 2006 Mount Merapi 
eruption, and an earthquake that struck Yogyakarta (Ananta, Arifin, & Suryadinata, 2005, p. 
135).  
Within this political context, it is important to note that the program development phase 
of the HWS was conducted under Wahid’s presidency, the HWS was initiated under 
Sukarnoputri and was completed under Yudhoyono. It stands to reason that three political 
administrations coupled with a slew of natural disasters during the implementation of the 
program will have affected the success of the program which again, was rated unsatisfactory in 
terms of outcome. When viewed through the structural lens, a number of conclusions can be 
drawn.  
First, while the political structures in Indonesia may have been functioning relatively 
soundly in the post-Suharto period (exemplified by the relatively democratic process of orderly 
transition of power), the institutions that are informed by the political structure exhibit 
dysfunction and sub-optimal conditions. Democratic elections were certainly held and transitions 
of power resulted with relative normalcy (periodic political unrest certainly occurred) however, 
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the degree of administrative upheaval between each successive leader bred significant volatility 
into the program intervention context. Second, while relatively free and fair democratic elections 
occurred, the prevalence of corruption within this process persisted. As mentioned earlier, the 
flows of program funding were notably opaque and difficult to trace from the source to the 
intended recipient sector and agents. 
From recognition of these institutional influences on the effectiveness of the HWS 
program, two possible avenues for tailored programs arise. First, one can conclude from the 
fledgling wave of health sector decentralisation that the reason the program failed was because of 
the immaturity of the decentralised system. The institutional strength necessary for a successful 
program of decentralisation was not sufficiently achieved in Indonesia at the time of 
implementation. Following the framework provided, the optimal program design would be one 
that facilitates institutional maturity. At first glance, the HWS seems exactly that, a program 
designed to provide support to the decentralised health sector for further entrenchment and 
enhanced performance. On closer inspection of the program components however, it becomes 
apparent that the program was not aimed at structural maturity of the decentralisation project due 
to the fact that the assumptions made by HWS developers were not in tune with the realities of 
Indonesia’s decentralised health sector. Rather, they made assumptions on what support for 
decentralisation should look like based on previous experiences with decentralisation, 
presumably based on other country contexts or on ‘best practice’ norms. In practice, this 
manifested in the form of assumed roles and responsibilities for Indonesian health officials and 
jurisdictions within the program implementation scheme. In effect the HWS aimed to mold the 
decentralised health system in accordance with pre-established norms of what decentralisation 
‘should’ look like. These norms were promoted for many of the East Asian countries, 
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specifically in the health sector by the World Health Organization which endorsed 
decentralization as a means by which citizens were better represented in decision-making and 
mechanisms for resource allocation were more efficiently than a centralised system (Lieberman, 
Capuno, & Minh, 2005, p. 156).This was no doubt done with the intention of maximising the 
benefit to patrons of the health sector, as has been established however, the program was 
unsuccessful and resulted in a waste of WB resources (Independent Evaluation Group, 2013, p. 
50).  
An important note here, while the program was unsuccessful, the lessons gleaned from 
the program experience are actually quite insightful in this review. Significant among them is the 
recognition that the recipient state possesses the capabilities to implement the program as it is 
designed. Based on what has now been established about the significance and precedence of 
structural considerations when developing programs, one can certainly argue that the program 
should be designed based on recipient capacity rather than the other way around. The logic that 
recipient state context is important is still sound. Namely, that recipient state context is 
important! Another promising lesson detailed by the IEG is that the program should ensure 
institutional flexibility. This speaks directly to the point made earlier regarding the many ways in 
which structural features of a state can be manifested through the institutions, i.e. just because 
decentralisation is lagging or inefficient in the Indonesian health sector, does not mean that 
decentralisation is ‘inappropriate’ for the Indonesian health sector. Rather, the point the IEG 
makes demonstrates the structural logic promoted here, that decentralisation in the context of the 
Indonesian health sector can manifest in a number of ways and while one manifestation may not 
be productive, promoting institutional flexibility may allow for different more productive 
manifestations of the structure. Keeping the baby, not the bathwater.  
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Based on available knowledge regarding Indonesia’s political limitations and the 
prevalence of corruption, I argue that for Indonesia decentralisation is the most effective route 
for sheltering the population from the negative effects of these institutional failings. Due to the 
likelihood for frequent political transitions of power and the policy volatility that breeds coupled 
with widespread corruption, the central government is a sub-optimal agent for program 
implementation. Subsequently, firming up decentralised authority in local districts is a non-status 
quo way to ensure structural maturation of service delivery mechanisms in Indonesia.  
How would a program that works to reinforce processes of decentralisation while 
building capacity among agents differ from the HWS? As has already been established, status 
quo structuration of the decentralised health governance system would need to be done through 
established roles and responsibilities. This would mean engaging directly with district, sector, 
and local agents. Monetary and technical resources would need to be administered directly to 
decentralised authorities rather than through the central government for eventual disbursement to 
districts. This would provide capacity to agents in the decentralised health system without 
diluting the effectiveness of the resources through the central sieve. The key difference with the 
proposed intervention would be to avoid central authority and to work within pre-established, 
context-specific roles and responsibilities. The impulse to weed out ineffective or redundant 
roles and responsibilities is understandable and ostensibly necessary. However, external 
development practitioners must recognize that this is an eventuality once the decentralised 
system gains sufficient capacity. Ownership for the development and articulation of elements of 
that system must belong to domestic agents if they are to take root past short-term administrative 
stints and be sustainable.  
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HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project—Lesotho 2005-2008 
The HIV and AIDS Capacity Building and Technical Assistance Project (HCTA) was 
conceived and developed by the World Bank and supported with a loan of US $ 5 million. The 
objective of the project was ‘to increase Lesotho’s capacity to use effectively the resources 
provided through a $29 million Global fund grant to support the implementation of HIV/AIDS 
programs within its ‘territory’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. xii). The project’s 
outcome is rated moderately satisfactory, the objectives of the project were deemed highly 
relevant, the relevance of the design of the project to these objectives was rated modest, the risk 
posed to the objectives of the project were rated substantial, overall bank performance was rated 
satisfactory, overall borrower performance was rated moderately satisfactory, implementing 
agency performance was rated moderately satisfactory, and monitoring and evaluation is rated 
modest. The objective to increase institutional capacity to use global fund resources was deemed 
substantially achieved. The objective to increase the institutional capacity to use these resources 
effectively was modestly achieved (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, pp. xii-xiii).  
Structural Analysis of HCTA 
The development problem being addressed by this program is not explicitly stated, this is 
expected since its mandate was one of support for a larger national HIV/AIDS strategic plan 
rather than spearheading a self-standing directive. As in other places in the world, HIV/AIDS has 
had a devastating impact on Lesotho. Lesotho has the tragic distinction however of being the 
country with the 3rd highest incidence rate of HIV/AIDS in the world (CIA , 2014). The national 
HIV/AIDS strategic plan and the corresponding policy framework were devised in recognition of 
the severity of the epidemic in Lesotho. The HCTA operated in the context of a $34 million grant 
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issued by the Global Fund to finance the national plan. Targeted groups were young people in 
Lesotho and people already living with HIV/AIDS:  
Strategies included youth education and prevention, behavioural change communication 
(BCC) and community outreach, condom distribution, prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV, care and support for the chronically ill and their families, 
antiretroviral treatment and monitoring, HIV counseling and testing, care and support for 
other orphans and other vulnerable children (OVCs), stigma reduction in all settings and 
respect for confidentiality, policy development (including workplace policy), and 
information systems and operational research.’ (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 
27) 
Several inter-connected and cross sectoral and structural influences have affected the extent of 
damage HIV/AIDS has wrought on Lesotho. Four underlying structural themes emerge in the 
analysis of program outcome: instability in political institutions; the influence of religious 
institutions; labour economy inefficiencies; and the compounding influence of other health issues 
in Lesotho.  
Lesotho has a historically turbulent political system, including periods of military rule, 
widespread protests and riots, and contested election results (United Nations Development 
Program, 2012). The PPAR identifies the political controversy surrounding the National AIDS 
Commission as a source for sub-optimal project outcome. There is recognition within Lesotho 
that the commission coupled with the appeal to the global fund was a political move to quell 
societal unrest surrounding the destruction HIV/AIDS has wrought on the people of Lesotho. 
The commission was seen as a face-saving political tool being used by the government of 
Lesotho to project the image of accountability and to appear to be proactive in the face of the 
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epidemic. Additionally, it was perceived to be sugar-coating sub-optimal government 
performance in other crucial sectors of society such as provision of public services to a grossly 
neglected rural population. The report identifies that if managerial staff in crucial positions in the 
health sector were to operate at full capacity, the program would have better chances of success 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 44). This supports the general assumptions regarding 
the lack of societal and political consensus on the aims of the National AIDS Commission and it 
being used solely as a tool of political leverage and to boost public image of the government 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 48).  
The influence of religious institutions on the success of HIV/AIDS initiatives similar to 
the one being examined here is also demonstrated in analysis of the project outcome. Lesotho is 
a predominantly Christian society and the influence of the Catholic Church on politics and 
society is significant. The PPAR identifies that the Catholic Church has intervened actively to 
prevent previous family planning interventions aimed at limiting the spread of the epidemic in 
Lesotho. This becomes particularly problematic when factoring in the fact that health service 
delivery is conducted mainly through the public Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MOHSW) and private, faith-based organizations, the largest of which is the Christian Health 
Association of Lesotho (CHAL) which operates roughly half of the country’s health facilities 
(Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 3). The public MOHSW and the private CHAL operate 
in different geographical locations such that they do not often compete for clients or services, 
rather people generally travel to which ever facility is closest. This means that roughly half the 
health care facilities administered by the CHAL and other private religious institutions may be 
offering HIV/AIDs treatment that does not incorporate proven family-planning preventative 
services. While the Global Fund resources coupled with the NAC do officially operate through 
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the public health sector, taking into account political instability and the assumed tokenism of the 
initiative, the risk that the resources are funneled away or misallocated in a way that they bolster 
the private health service sector are high. This would be a valuable research undertaking for 
future program development.  
Structural inefficiencies in key aspects of the economy are also evident in program 
outcome. The labour economy is revealingly influencing success of HIV/AIDS initiatives in 
Lesotho as well as detrimentally affecting other key aspects of society. According to the PPAR, 
Lesotho’s human resources sector is in a state of ‘perpetual crisis’ (Independent Evaluation 
Group, 2010, pp. 4 (Box 1-1)). Crucially, this means that doctors and nurses in Lesotho are 
dangerously scarce given the severity of the epidemic. The majority of Lesotho’s physicians and 
nurses are from neighbouring states who work in Lesotho on a temporary basis while they await 
accreditation in South Africa and abroad. This brain drain is a damning exposition on the 
inefficiencies in Lesotho’s labour economy. The IEG recommends that special attention must be 
paid to the establishment of a sustainable human resources retention program (Independent 
Evaluation Group, 2010, p. 49).  
Lastly, the prevalence and gravity of other health issues in Lesotho operate in confluence 
with the HIV/AIDS epidemic to tax an already weak health system. The PPAR speculates that 
the focus of the HCTA program on solely Global Fund (and therefore solely HIV/AIDS issues) 
resources may have exacerbated the neglect of other debilitating health issues in Lesotho. Further 
compounding cross-sectoral and structural influences on the effectiveness of HCTA and Global 
fund interventions is the persistence of Tuberculosis in Lesotho. In addition to having the third 
highest incidence rate of HIV/AIDS, Lesotho also has the fifth highest incidence rate of TB in 
the world. Contracting TB is the leading cause death for those already living with HIV/AIDS. 
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Worse still, the number of people with multidrug and extensive drug resistant strains of TB are 
suspected of rising (Independent Evaluation Group, 2010, pp. 44-45). The IEG recommends that 
HIV/AIDS programs must be balanced with attention to, and integration with, other key health 
priorities.  
Applying the structurationist framework to this structural profile, a number of 
observations and recommendations can be made. The influence of religious institutions on the 
impact and societal approval of family planning initiatives and outcomes is evident. Lesotho is a 
predominantly Christian nation, as such religious institutions engage in status quo agent-structure 
interaction and define certain health sector initiatives and preclude prospects for success. 
Acknowledging that there is growing dissent in Lesotho regarding the epidemic and the way it is 
being addressed by administration, it is possible to avoid passing societal and religious 
judgement on the people of Lesotho as being inherently ill-equipped as a predominantly 
Christian nation to contend with the epidemic. It is evident that the flaw does not lie in the 
religiously inclined ‘Christian-ness’ of Lesotho since dissent is audible and growing regarding 
the status quo. Following structurationist logic this dissent is not un-Christian and is actually 
only possible within the parameters dictated by the religious structure. From this, one can take 
cues from the non-status quo religious structural parameters and investigate what permissions are 
allowed within the religious structure to allow for more welcome adoption of family planning 
interventions.  
In regards to inefficiencies in the labour economy and the compounding influence of 
other health issues in Lesotho, the instability of the political system is identified through 
application of the structurationist framework as a non-productive vehicle for status quo 
structuration. From this it is recommended here that HIV/AIDS interventions in Lesotho must 
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target a number of sectors to ensure holistic improvement not only to raise chances of successful 
development outcomes but also to minimise the risk that successful outcomes are only quick-
fixes. Additionally, development interventions in Lesotho must take religious structural 
parameters into consideration when developing programs. There is evidence to suggest that the 
religious structural parameters in Lesotho do allow for dissent in regards to the non-productive 
status quo (in this case, the Churches decrees on family planning). Successful programs crafted 
with an ear to the structural grounding of Lesotho will explore Christian teachings that would 
create a permissive and welcoming environment for proven HIV/AIDS interventions such as 
family planning and operationalise these teachings. In structural terms, this would be nurturing 
and maturing the religious structure in a way that produces non-status quo institutional teaching. 
Alternately, development interventions would identify agents who are engaging in non-status 
quo protests and assist them in carving more productive routes of structuration. On the other 
hand, given what has been established about the multi-sectoral, layered and dysfunctional effects 
of political, economic, and religious structures in Lesotho, development interventions should be 
crafted in a way which empower agents with knowledge who identify flaws in the status quo to 
plant their own seeds of novel institutions. This can mean financing agents with knowledge 
within Lesotho to create health service outlets which operate legally within the political 
parameters but which employ non-status quo agents and who operate outside the public purview. 
If private religious institutions persist in contributing to the inefficiency of HIV/AIDS prevention 
programs, this subversion of existing structures can manifest in a non-status quo religious 
fashion or can be secular and private.  
Analysis and Structural Profiles 
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Through examination of development interventions and the analysis of those 
interventions through structurationist principles, the value of systemic thinking in developing 
interventions becomes apparent. This chapter will provide a tentative framework for creating 
structural profiles of recipient states prior to an intervention and aims to operationalize principles 
from Paris and Accra. This profile includes an outline of the structural features of the state as 
well as a study of the institutional ones. In this analysis, structures will be far more static over 
time and space than institutions and will dictate the parameters and permissions of resulting 
institutions. Examples of these foundational structures include but are not limited to: patriarchy, 
the type of political system, the economic system, ethno-religious dynamics and degree of 
religious or secular precedence throughout society. The institutional features of the state will be 
more iterative in the sense that they may exist in different forms over time and space and have 
the capacity to evolve. They may build upon each other or evolve (for better or worse) over time. 
Regardless, each institutional manifestation of the structure will be informed by its precursors. 
Examples of these relatively superficial institutions include: economic institutions such as banks, 
religious institutions such as synagogues, churches, mosques, political institutions such as the 
legislature or public service, and specific ethno-religiously segregated schools, places of business 
and community centres.  
The structural profiles of states will differ less since all states in the international system 
must adhere to global normative assumptions of what qualifies as a state. The different iterations 
of resulting institutions are the observable qualities by which degrees of development are 
assessed. It is the health and sustainability/productivity of these institutions that will be targeted 
or avoided by the development intervention devised as a means of affecting structural change. 
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Depending on whether practitioners are engaging in structural maturation or non-status quo 
subversion, they can then target the appropriate agents.  
How might this be achieved? Practitioners must identify a development problem in 
consultation with or under the direction of domestic authorities. First, the development problem 
must be explicitly stated as the process of defining will inform the subsequent institutional 
analysis. It is important to note that this explicit articulation of the problem is missing in several 
IEG program review documents. Next, instead of asking ‘how do we fix this?’ practitioners 
should ask ‘why is this the case?’ While pure subjectivity in development work may leave many 
spinning their wheels on the philosophical repercussions of ‘developing’ a state, the objectivity 
that persists in development work is also detrimental.  
Practitioners must use structural profiles to inform development objectives within the 
recipient state. More specifically, they must analyze the structural profiles of the recipient to 
inform their development interventions, this will help determine systemic causality for the 
development problem identified. In addition to development and analysis of structural and 
institutional profiles, practitioners must also identify whether the status quo is productive or at 
the very least, on a promising trajectory. Identifying this will dictate whether 
structural/institutional maturation is required, narrowing the range of appropriate interventions 
and development agents. Alternately, the institutions may be revealed to be dysfunctional or non-
productive/contributive to the degree of development of the recipient. In this scenario, the 
recipient features a non-productive status quo and institutional subversion or supplementation is 
warranted. Agents with knowledge are the appropriate vehicle for this type of development 
intervention.  
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Based on analysis of the structural and institutional variables that intervene and affect a 
development issue and its outcome, practitioners can arrive at a number of possible interventions 
that incorporate these structural/institutional features into the proposed solution. According to the 
systemic thinking proposed through structuration theory, these proposed interventions will often 
target intervening structures that may not appear at the outset to be related to the development 
problem. The goal is to support and maintain the prerequisites for a successful development 
outcome. This may be criticised by many as ‘mission creep’ however, systems-level thinking 
advocates holistic approaches to problems in which case, the solution to the problem must 
permeate and create positive precursors throughout the structural and institutional system of a 
recipient state in order to generate sustained development. Possible interventions should target 
religious institutions, economic institutions, and the patriarchy.  














Structures and institutions are the basic building blocks of the state. In order to effect 
change within a state, agents of development must first and foremost target these roots of any 
identified development issue. Interventions must be organic and must be implemented through 
the appropriate domestic agents. Practitioners and theorists alike must identify whether a 
developing state features an unproductive structural status-quo, an immature structural status 
quo, or a productive structural status quo. Once this is identified, depending on what the 
intervention is attempting on a thematic level, the appropriate agents for implementation will 
become evident.  
This thesis has introduced structuration theory to conceptualize contemporary failings in 
development theory and practice. A detailed distinction between types of agents has been 
presented: passive agents, agents with knowledge, and empowered agents within a state. 
Additionally, I have articulated the structural and institutional-level mechanisms by which 
development interventions fail, succeed, or are otherwise derailed. I have also articulated the 
mechanisms by which externally-directed development initiatives unwittingly reinforce, 
undermine, or promote realities of ‘underdevelopment’ within the recipient state. Lastly, I have 
introduced the idea of ‘status quo’ or ‘non-status quo’ structuration and structural subversion. I 
believe these are crucial ideas to incorporate into development theory and practice.  
This paper contributes conceptually to both the theory and practice of development while 
offering practical analytical tools by which the often abstract concepts presented in this paper 
may be operationalized. The key motivation that has driven this research is that there is no silver 
bullet in the ‘doing’ of development. The diversity of life from the local to the global is immense 
and complex. Development theorists and practitioners must now contend with the complexity of 
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their field, in earnest. To assume a generic, objective ‘end’ to the development enterprise, is to 
willingly embrace the parochial.  
I advocate a form of radical subjectivity in the conceptualization of development issues 
and contend that the analytical framework offered in this paper is an objectively useful and 
universally applicable tool in development practice. To ground this subjectivity and avoid the 
ambiguity of conceptualizing development as a ‘choose your own mission’ style endeavour in 
which ‘development is what you make of it’, I recognize the necessity of certain objective 
indicators and goals of development which can inform subjective interventions. Practitioners 
should take regular ‘snapshots’ of a developing state on current performance vis à vis these 
indicators. The World Bank already performs this type of data collection, it is now on 
practitioners to analyse that data towards meaningful conclusions regarding the micro-processes 
of state development and the external agent’s role in facilitating or subverting those processes. 
Development in this sense can be measured as progress against these indicators. Universal 
indicators for development action like the poverty line of $1.25/day would remain in use by 
international agencies like the World Bank to help prioritize the most pressing cases for 
intervention. From this then, my contribution calls for radical subjectivity in both the 
conceptualization and analysis of both the development issue and in the engineering of whatever 
intervention is devised in response—not development as a whole. For example, domestic agents 
with contextual knowledge of what ails the recipient state may not say ‘we need to strengthen 
our education system’, instead, they may say ‘we need to strengthen the ability of the state to 
redistribute economic gains to the wider population’. Knowledgeable agents may prioritize the 
latter because they know that despite the dire need for a stronger education system, it would not 
be feasible without the adequate financial capital and appropriate allocative mechanisms for that 
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capital. So, despite knowing that basic needs like education are crucial for development, I argue 
that the correct domestic agents are inherently better equipped to assess order of operations for 
achieving those basic needs. By combining the subjective and the objective in development, I 
advocate creating space for the subjective, contextual order of operation that is necessary to 
pursue and achieve objective goals. In this sense, I advocate systems-thinking in conceptualizing 
development issues in order to arrive at a targeted and precise, context- specific development 
intervention. This radical subjectivity enables agents of development to move past lip-service 
and recognize that the capacity by which the developed world influences and molds the domestic 
and the global is the same capacity that lies latent in the developing world.  
The aim of development study and practice should be to awaken this potential so that the 
developing world may also articulate in myriad and complex ways, what a developed state can 
look like. As demonstrated, the pursuit of replicability or some reliable development prescription 
is problematic. Therefore, I call for an actionable protocol that is thematic rather than specific 
that can be used by practitioners who could then provide the contextual information necessary 
for the specific recipient state in question. This will require checking assumptions that persist to 
this day in the development enterprise originating from the West that recipient states are 
inherently inept and then acting on this realization.                                                                       
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